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Overview
Part 1 of this thesis is a literature review which explores the relationship between 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), shame and inner dialogues. Cognitive theory 
suggests that PTSD results when an individual processes the trauma/trauma sequelae in 
a way that causes an ongoing sense of current threat. Although fear is the emotion most 
readily linked with threat, following from the ideas of Ehlers and Clark (2000) this study 
suggests that the experience of shame might also contribute to an ongoing sense of 
current threat, as it attacks an individual’s psychological integrity, leaving them feeling 
inferior, devalued and socially unattractive. This study suggests that shame results when 
individuals engage in self-critical inner dialogues and also lack self-reassuring inner 
dialogues, which can make the self feel safe again. Part 2 is an empirical paper which 
tests the relationships proposed in the literature review. Specifically it is hypothesised 
that individuals with PTSD associated with higher levels of shame, will be more prone 
to engage in self-critical thinking and less prone to engage in self-reassuring thinking, 
than individuals with PTSD who report lower levels of shame, and that this would be 
independent of levels of depression. The results largely supported the hypotheses, with 
the exception that shame was not associated with self-reassurance independently of 
depression. Part 3 is a critical appraisal. The first section offers reflections on the 
research process, including limitations and ideas for future research. The second section 
outlines clinical implications of the research.
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Abstract
Fear, helplessness and horror are the emotions traditionally linked with posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and are central to the current diagnostic criteria. However recent 
research suggests that a range of other emotions may also play a role in PTSD, and 
researchers have specifically identified a subgroup of people whose severity of PTSD 
was linked to the severity of shame they experienced. Recently researchers have been 
interested in the role individuals’ inner dialogues have on the development and 
maintenance of shame. Specifically it has been suggested that shame is linked to self- 
critical inner dialogues and an inability to be caring and compassionate towards the self. 
In this paper these ideas are explored in relation to PTSD. It is suggested that self- 
criticism and a lack of a caring and compassionate part of the self can lead individuals 
who have suffered a trauma to experience high levels of shame and as a consequence 
feel as if their psychological integrity is under threat. Continued self-critical attacks 
maintain a sense of ongoing current threat, which as specified in Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model of PTSD is central to the creation and maintenance of PTSD. It 
is suggested that treatment interventions that focus on the development of a caring and 
compassionate part of the self are likely to prove a beneficial adjunct to traditional 
exposure based treatments for individuals who have PTSD associated with high levels of 
shame.
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Introduction
Shame and its relationship to psychopathology has received substantial interest in recent 
years. For instance, shame has been known to play an important role in depression 
(Andrews, 1995; Gilbert, Pehl & Allen, 1994), social anxiety (Gilbert & Trower, 1990), 
alcoholism (Brown, 1991), hostility (Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1992) and 
narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Wurmser, 1987). There is also an increasing 
recognition that shame might play a role in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Andrews, Brewin, Rose & Kirk, 2000; Brewin, Andrews & Rose, 2000; Grey, Holmes 
& Brewin, 2001; Grey, Young & Holmes, 2002; Holmes, Grey & Young, 2005; Lee, 
Grey & Reynolds, in preparation; Lee, Scragg & Turner, 2001). PTSD has traditionally 
been associated with the emotions of fear, helplessness and horror. Indeed this 
subjective experience is central to the diagnostic criteria of PTSD (DSM-IV-TR, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). However recent research has shown that other 
emotions also play a role in PTSD and Andrews et al. (2000) found that shame 
independently predicted PTSD at one month and six months post trauma. Similarly Lee 
et al. (in preparation) identified a subgroup of people whose severity of PTSD was 
associated with the severity of shame they experienced.
Recent attention has been given to the role that individuals’ inner dialogues might play 
in the development of affect (Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert, Baldwin, Irons, Baccus & Palmer, 
in press; Gilbert, Clarke, Hempel, Miles & Irons, 2004). It is proposed that just as 
individuals have dialogues with those in the external world, individuals can also have 
inner dialogues with themselves. This idea presupposes that individuals can act out 
multiple internalised self-roles. It is specifically thought that dominant-subordinate self­
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self inner dialogues are linked to shame, where one part of the self is attacking and 
critical while another part feels attacked and criticised. Gilbert (2000) notes that 
individuals who experience shame also seem to lack the ability to be caring and 
compassionate towards the self, making it more likely that they will submit to their own 
self-critical attacks. He suggests that helping people develop inner caring and 
compassion towards the self may be an extremely important therapeutic technique when 
working with individuals experiencing shame.
The role of fear as a key emotion in PTSD has led to the application of therapeutic 
techniques that focus on imaginal exposure/re-living (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa & 
Meadows, 1997). However the recognition of other emotions in PTSD has fuelled the 
development of alternative and complementary approaches to traditional exposure 
based-treatment (Grey et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2001; Tarrier, Sommerfield, Pilgrim & 
Humphreys, 1999). The recent finding that some individuals with PTSD experience high 
levels of shame suggests that techniques that focus on developing an individual’s inner 
caring and compassion may also be helpful in the treatment of PTSD.
This paper reviews the literature on PTSD, shame and inner dialogues, exploring the 
theory, evidence and relationships between these concepts. The paper begins with an 
exploration of PTSD, reviewing the conceptual history, diagnostic criteria, theories and 
current treatment. Shame is then explored, starting with a discussion on how shame 
differs from other emotions such as guilt and self-esteem. The origins and development 
of shame are then considered, specifically focussing on an evolutionary perspective. The 
literature that links shame and PTSD is then reviewed. Then next section focuses on
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inner dialogues, exploring conceptual issues, origins and development and research. The 
potential relationship between PTSD, shame and inner dialogues is then presented. 
Specifically it is suggested that self-critical inner dialogues and a lack of a caring and 
compassionate part of the self can lead individuals who have suffered a trauma to 
experience high levels of shame. It is suggested that the experience of shame causes 
and/or maintains the current threat associated with PTSD, as it attacks an individual’s 
psychological integrity, leaving them feeling devalued, powerless and socially 
unattractive. It is therefore proposed that treatment interventions that focus on 
developing caring and compassion might prove beneficial when working with this client 
group. The review concludes with a summary and discussion of ideas for future research 
in this area.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Conceptual History of PTSD
PTSD was first formally acknowledged as a distinct diagnostic category in DSM-III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) and was added primarily to resolve a dilemma 
for clinicians of how to classify seemingly ‘normal’ individuals who went on to develop 
long-term clinical symptoms after involvement in an extremely traumatic event. DSM-I 
and DSM-II (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, 1968, respectively) 
acknowledged the influence that stressful events could have on clinical symptoms (gross 
stress reaction, transient situational disturbance) but viewed longer term reactions to 
stress as being related to an individual’s pre-morbid vulnerabilities, and thus attracted 
diagnoses such as anxiety or depressive neuroses (Yuhuda & McFarlane, 1995). The 
inclusion of PTSD in DSM-III allowed post-trauma reactions to be seen within a
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framework of normal behaviour, where the primary cause of clinical symptoms was 
exposure to a traumatic event rather than an individual’s pre-morbid vulnerabilities. This 
addressed the social and political agenda at the time which was trying to deal with the 
humanitarian concern about victims of trauma being labelled and blamed for their post­
trauma reactions.
However PTSD as a normal response to a traumatic event does not fully explain the 
clinical picture of PTSD that has emerged, and Yuhuda and McFarlane (1995) have 
outlined a number of points that contradict the notion of PTSD as a normal stress 
response. Firstly they highlight the research that has shown that following exposure to a 
traumatic event PTSD tends to be the ‘exception rather than the rule’ and that research 
has failed to show a consistent association between the severity of PTSD and the 
magnitude of the trauma, which would be expected if PTSD was a normal stress 
response. They also draw on the literature that shows that individuals with PTSD have 
high rates of co-morbidity with other psychiatric disorders, which suggests that exposure 
to a traumatic event may trigger a whole host of symptoms and not just those associated 
with PTSD. This suggests that PTSD might be associated with an underlying 
predisposition to certain states, which is triggered by exposure to a traumatic event 
rather than PTSD being an isolated and normal stress response.
Recent theories of PTSD no longer view PTSD as a normal response to trauma and 
focus instead on trying to formulate what factors determine whether an individual will 
develop PTSD following exposure to a traumatic event (see section on Psychological 
Theories o f PTSD below).
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Current Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) outlines a number of criteria that 
an individual needs to meet in order to receive a diagnosis of PTSD. Exposure to a 
traumatic event is defined by; (1) direct personal experience of an event that involves 
actual or threatened death, serious injury or threat to one’s physical integrity or (2) 
witnessing an event that involves death, serious injury or threat to the physical integrity 
of another person or (3) learning that a family member or close associate has suffered an 
unexpected or violent death, serious harm or a threat of death or injury. In order to gain a 
diagnosis of PTSD a subjective criteria must be met; an individual’s response during the 
trauma must have involved feelings of intense fear, hopelessness or horror. In addition 
an individual must also be experiencing a range of symptoms following trauma, which 
include persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated 
with the trauma, a numbing of general responsiveness and persistent symptoms of 
increased arousal. These symptoms need to be present for at least 1 month and cause 
significant impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Difficulties with Current Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD
Recently the subjective component of the DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD has been 
criticised. It specifies that individuals must have experienced certain emotional reactions 
during exposure to a traumatic event, namely those of fear, helplessness or horror. 
However, Brewin et al. (2000) suggest that some individuals might have memory loss, 
such as those having suffered drug rape or head injury, which makes it difficult or 
impossible to attribute specific emotions that were experienced during a traumatic event.
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They also feel that it is not unreasonable to expect that some individuals may respond to 
a traumatic event by feeling numb or dazed which is likely to impact on their ability to 
register or fully experience their emotional states at the time of the trauma. Some 
traumatic events happen so quickly that it is difficult for an individual to be aware of 
their emotional state at the time, such as in some motor vehicle accidents. Brewin et al. 
(2000) additionally make the distinction between ‘primary emotions’, such as those 
experienced at the time of the trauma, and ‘secondary emotions’ which are experienced 
after a traumatic event. They suggest that secondary emotions may be fundamentally 
different to primary emotions as they are based on cognitive appraisals following the 
trauma. They suggest that these secondary emotional reactions are likely to have an 
impact on the later development of PTSD but that these are not made reference to in 
DSM-IV-TR. Indeed, while research by these authors demonstrated that the emotions of 
fear, helplessness and horror experienced at the time of the trauma were related to the 
later development of PTSD, they also found that a sub-group of individuals did not 
appear to experience intense emotions at the time of the trauma, despite experiencing the 
other persistent features of PTSD. These individuals did however report strong emotions 
of either anger or shame (hypothesised secondary emotions) and these emotions had 
independent effects on later PTSD. The authors suggest that these results indicate that 
the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD may have to be amended to include emotions 
other than just fear, helplessness and horror, and that it may be beneficial to include 
secondary emotional reactions as well as primary ones.
Although it has been shown that there are a variety of emotional experiences associated 
with PTSD, theories of PTSD generally hold that the predominant emotional experience
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is fear and feeling under threat. However theories of PTSD differ in their emphasis on 
how fear/threat develops and is maintained post-trauma and recent theories in particular 
allow an examination of how emotions other than fear may contribute to this.
Psychological Theories of PTSD 
Early Theories of PTSD
Adverse reactions to trauma have been addressed by many different theorists, which has 
led to the development of biological theories (e.g., Van der Kolk, Boyd, Kystal & 
Greenburg, 1984), psychodynamic theories (e.g., Freud, 1919) and behavioural theories 
(e.g., Fairbank & Brown, 1987). However it is perhaps the cognitive theories of PTSD 
that have received the most attention and generated the most research in recent years and 
it is on these theories that this review will focus.
Two early cognitive theories of PTSD are the social-cognitive theories and the 
information processing theories. Social-cognitive theories focus on the impact of the 
trauma on an individual’s pre-existing beliefs and how new trauma related information 
is integrated into these beliefs and/or shatters existing beliefs (Horowitz, 1973, 1976; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1985, 1992). In contrast the information processing theories of PTSD 
emphasise how trauma related information is stored and processed in the cognitive 
system (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989). While both of these approaches have been 
highly influential they are unable to account for all of the clinical symptoms and relevant 
research data on PTSD. They also do not adequately explain why some individuals 
exposed to a traumatic event go on to develop PTSD while others do not. Brewin and 
Holmes (2003) review three recent theories of PTSD that they believe have greater
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scope and stronger explanatory power than the earlier theories described above. These 
are; (1) The emotional processing theory (2) The dual representational theory and (3) 
Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model.
Emotional Processing Theory
The emotional processing theory (Foa & Riggs, 1993; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) is based 
on an earlier information processing theory proposed by Foa et al. (1989), which 
suggested that traumatic events led to the creation of a fear network in memory, which 
consists of strong associations between stimuli associated with the trauma (sights, 
sounds, smells, texture), emotional, behavioural and physiological responses (fear, 
running away, heart pounding) and the meaning of the event (defenceless, at risk). The 
fear network is proposed to be easily activated and brought to conscious mind (re- 
experiencing symptoms) because higher order conditioning and stimulus generalisation 
mean that even stimuli remotely similar to those associated with the trauma can cause its 
activation. In order for the traumatic event to be integrated into the normal memory 
system the associations within the fear network need to be weakened. Foa et al. (1989) 
suggest that this can be done by deliberately activating the fear network through 
exposure and modifying it by adding information that is incompatible to it (such as the 
habituation of fear). The emotional processing theory elaborates on the fear network 
approach by incorporating ideas from the social-cognitive theories. For example, it 
includes ideas about how an individual’s beliefs prior, during and after exposure to a 
traumatic event might interact and contribute to chronic PTSD. It is suggested that the 
more rigid an individual’s beliefs prior to a traumatic event the more likely it is that an 
individual will develop PTSD. This applies equally to rigid positive and negative beliefs;
it is conceived that an individual with rigid positive beliefs would find it extremely hard 
to integrate contradictory trauma related information into their belief system whereas an 
individual with rigid negative beliefs would take trauma related information as evidence 
that their negative beliefs were true. According to the emotional processing theory 
exposure not only reduces associations within the fear network but also offers the 
individual an opportunity to re-appraise the event and their actions and thus ultimately 
modify unhelpful beliefs that may have been reinforced or developed since the trauma 
(Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).
Dual Representation Theory
Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996) also integrated elements of the social-cognitive 
theories with the information-processing theories in their dual representational theory of 
PTSD. They propose that there are two types of trauma memory; (1) situationally 
accessible memories (SAMs), which are not readily accessible to the conscious mind 
and are encoded at the time of the trauma in a sensory, fragmented and context less 
manner and (2) verbally accessible memories (VAMs), which are readily accessible to 
the conscious mind and can be deliberately and progressively accessed and updated in 
autobiographical memory. SAMs are thought to be stored in the amygdala whereas 
VAMs are thought to be stored in the hippocampus (Brewin, 2001). SAMs cannot be 
deliberately recalled but are activated by stimuli associated to the trauma and once 
activated they are often experienced as if the traumatic event is happening again in the 
here and now (flashbacks). The authors suggest that the emotions associated with SAMs 
are ‘primary emotions’, which were experienced when the traumatic event occurred. In
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contrast VAMs are thought to be associated with ‘secondary emotions’, which result 
from cognitive appraisals following the traumatic event.
Brewin (2001) proposed that SAMs are formed because under extreme threat the 
hypothalamus secretes glucocorticoid steroids, causing impaired hippocampal 
processing, and thus VAMs which are likely to be incomplete and disorganised. In 
contrast the function of the amygdala is proposed to be enhanced in situations of 
extreme stress making it likely that detailed SAMs will be encoded. It is hypothesised 
that SAMs and VAMs will compete for retrieval and thus VAMs which are incomplete 
and disorganised will make it more likely that SAMs will have a retrieval bias. Brewin 
et al. (1996) propose that persistent PTSD is characterised by continued activation of 
SAMs and a failure to create sufficient VAMs. They propose that successful resolution 
of PTSD occurs when a sufficient number of VAMs are created which block the 
activation of SAMs. It is proposed that VAMs will have a retrieval advantage if they 
contain trauma information which is more distinctive, better rehearsed, and more recent, 
than the trauma information represented in the SAM system.
Ehlers and Clark’s Cognitive Model
This model proposes that persistent PTSD only develops if individuals process the 
trauma/trauma sequelae in a way that causes them to experience a sense of ongoing 
current threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This threat can been seen as external, such as 
seeing the world as a more dangerous place, or internal, such as seeing oneself as a less 
capable or acceptable human being. Once this sense of current threat is manifest in the 
aftermath of trauma it is accompanied by re-experiencing symptoms, symptoms of
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arousal and adverse emotional reactions, which in themselves perpetuate the sense of 
ongoing current threat. It is proposed that individuals engage in a number of coping 
strategies aimed at minimising this threat, such as avoidance and control strategies, 
which in the long run actually maintain rather than reduce the sense of current threat 
generated.
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD proposes that there are two factors 
which lead to the development of a sense of ongoing current threat; (1) the nature of the 
trauma memory and (2) appraisals of the trauma and/or the trauma sequelae. Ehlers and 
Clark (2000) proposed that trauma memories that are poorly elaborated and inadequately 
integrated in context of time, place, subsequent and previous information and other 
autobiographical memories, lead to a sense of current ongoing threat. This is caused by 
the here and now quality produced once these memories are activated and the failure of 
these memories to be incorporated into an individual’s belief systems. Interacting with 
this are people’s appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae. Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
proposed several types of appraisals that can contribute to a sense of current threat being 
generated which include; negative appraisals of the traumatic event, negative appraisals 
of how one reacted during the trauma or how one has reacted since the trauma, negative 
appraisals of the symptoms of PTSD, and negative appraisals of the meaning of the 
traumatic event.
The three recent theories of PTSD presented above have all been highly influential and 
to some extent describe similar or overlapping ideas. They have all generated a great 
deal of research and have been able to account for many of the phenomena associated
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with PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). However it is Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive model of PTSD that has provided the most detailed account of the 
development and maintenance of PTSD to date, and has thus perhaps had the greatest 
impact clinically (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).
Cognitive Behavioural Treatment of PTSD
Along with the variety of theoretical approaches to PTSD there are also a number of 
different treatment approaches that have been applied. However it is the cognitive- 
behavioural treatments that have received the most attention in recent years. There is 
now a substantial evidence base which demonstrates the effectiveness of cognitive- 
behavioural treatments for PTSD (e.g., Blake & Sonnenberg, 1998; Foa & Kozak, 1986; 
Marks, Lovell, Noshirvani, Livanou & Thrasher, 1998; Richards, Lovell & Marks, 1994) 
and recent guidelines published by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (2004) 
advocate trauma focused cognitive behavioural therapy as the treatment of choice for 
PTSD.
Based on the idea that fear is one of the primary emotions experienced at the time of the 
trauma and is also likely to be re-experienced again alongside trauma related intrusions 
many cognitive-behavioural approaches have focused on the use of exposure based 
paradigms such as re-living as an important component in the treatment of PTSD. This 
has been done in a number of ways including systematic desensitisation (e.g., Frank et 
al., 1988), imaginal exposure (e.g., Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs & Murdock, 1991), in-vivo 
techniques (e.g., Foa et al., 1991; Thompson, Charlton, Kerry, Lee & Turner, 1995) and 
writing a detailed account of the trauma (e.g., Resick & Schnicke, 1993). A great deal of
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research has shown that the use of prolonged imaginal exposure to memories of the 
traumatic event is an effective treatment intervention for PTSD. Indeed in their review 
of different treatment approaches for PTSD Foa and Meadows (1997) concluded that 
prolonged exposure ‘might be considered the treatment of choice for PTSD’ (p. 475). 
Nevertheless other cognitive-behavioural approaches that do not include exposure as a 
specific component have been shown to be successful in the treatment of PTSD. For 
example, Foa and Meadows (1997) also found that stress inoculation training, which is 
an anxiety management program drawing on different educational and skill components 
(e.g., relaxation, thought stopping and guided self-dialog) is successful in reducing 
symptoms of PTSD. Other studies have shown that cognitive therapy without exposure 
is also effective in treating PTSD, and that this is as successful as prolonged exposure 
(Marks et al., 1998; Tarrier et al., 1999). However Grey et al. (2002) note that although 
studies have shown the effectiveness of cognitive therapy they have not to date shown 
that cognitive therapy alone shows any advantage over prolonged exposure.
More recently treatments methods that include both an element of prolonged exposure 
and cognitive therapy have been advocated for the treatment of PTSD (e.g., Kubany et 
al., 2004). Indeed the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggests that 
treatment for PTSD needs to address a number of different areas and that a multi- 
component approach is necessary. They discuss the need to; (1) elaborate and integrate 
the trauma memory into an individual’s autobiographical memory system, which will 
reconcile it with an individual’s prior and subsequent experiences and reduce re- 
experiencing symptoms (2) tackle any unhelpful secondary appraisals about the trauma 
or its sequelae that are contributing to an ongoing sense of current threat and (3) tackle
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any unhelpful behaviours or cognitive strategies which might be preventing the 
individual from elaborating and integrating the trauma memory, maintaining 
dysfunctional cognitions or exacerbating symptoms. They suggest a variety of 
approaches that could be implemented to achieve this but recommend some of the 
following; education and rationale for the treatment plan, exposure (both imaginal and 
in-vivo), cognitive restructuring (both prior to exposure and during exposure), and 
imagery techniques. It is interesting to note that although the rationale behind exposure 
was initially based on the concepts of classical and operant conditioning and the 
habituation of fear, the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) offers a 
different rationale for the use of exposure. The authors suggest a number of functions 
that exposure might play: firstly it allows the trauma memory to be accessed and 
elaborated, promoting its integration in autobiographical memory; secondly it can help 
identify idiosyncratic appraisals of the trauma; finally it can act as a behavioural 
experiment to counteract beliefs that individuals may have about not being able to cope 
with thinking about the trauma.
Grey et al. (2002) elaborate on the idea of cognitive restructuring during exposure and 
provide a comprehensive exploration and description of how this can be achieved 
clinically. They discuss the notion of peri traumatic emotional ‘hotspots’, which are 
conceived as peak moments of emotional distress in the trauma memory. They argue 
that applying cognitive restructuring to tackle these ‘hotspots’ during re-living can 
significantly enhance the effectiveness of treatment for PTSD. They suggest that this 
technique might be particularly relevant for peritraumatic ‘hotspots’ associated with 
negative-self evaluation, such as those related to feelings of shame, guilt and anger,
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which unlike cognitions related to fear, are unlikely to spontaneously restructure through 
traditional exposure methods.
It is important that treatment for PTSD continues evolving and responding to recent 
research findings. Of specific interest to this review is the finding that some individuals 
with PTSD appear to suffer high levels of shame (Andrews et al., 2000; Brewin et al., 
2000; Grey et al., 2001; Grey et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2005; Lee et al., in preparation; 
Lee et al., 2001). Although recent therapeutic techniques are beginning to address the 
range of emotions suffered by individuals with PTSD, it is likely to prove beneficial if 
more research and thought is given to specific techniques that might prove particularly 
effective for individuals with PTSD suffering high levels of shame. These ideas will be 
discussed further below (see section on, PTSD, Shame, and Inner Dialogues). However, 
firstly it is important that the concept of shame is explored in depth.
Shame 
Definitions of Shame
Shame has been defined as a ‘self-conscious’ emotion relating to feelings of 
powerlessness, inferiority, a sense of social unattractiveness and a desire to hide or 
conceal deficiencies (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 
1996). As a result the experience of shame is often considered a private emotion which 
involves ‘the self evaluating the self and can have a wide ranging impact on an 
individual and their relationships (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame can have different 
foci and what each person experiences as shaming will depend a great deal on their 
upbringing and cultural background. For example, some people might experience shame
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about a particular part of their body, whilst others might feel shame about the kind of 
person they think they are or the kind of things they have experienced. Others might 
experience reflected shame, where shame is brought upon them through their 
relationship with others (e.g., being related to a criminal). Alternatively one’s own 
shame can reflect onto others (e.g., family members, friends or cultural group).
Whatever the foci of shame, the end result is that an individual feels devalued, inferior 
and socially unattractive as a result of their perceived deficiencies. Gilbert makes the 
distinction between external and internal shame (Gilbert, 1997). He proposed that 
external shame is related to what we believe others think of us (belief that others 
consider us unattractive and devalued), while internal shame is related to how we see 
ourselves (the self is experienced as unattractive and devalued). Of course these 
concepts are not conveyed as mutually exclusive and many individuals may experience 
both external and internal shame.
Although many researchers and clinicians are interested in the concept of shame, it is 
often confused with other emotions. It is important however to distinguish shame from 
these other emotions as they have differing impacts on cognition, behaviour and the 
development of psychopathology.
Shame and Guilt
The concepts of shame and guilt are often used interchangeably and Tangney and 
Dearing (2002) note that this applies to researchers as well as lay people. They cite a 
variety of examples where clinicians/researchers talk about ‘shame and guilt’ as if they 
were one and the same thing. They also highlight the fact that lay people often talk about
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‘guilt’ when what they have really described is shame and that this is related to the fact 
that guilt is seen as the more socially acceptable emotion. However research has shown 
that although shame and guilt are related concepts and that many individuals are prone 
to experience both, these two concepts are actually fundamentally different in a number 
of ways. Research has shown that the situations that give rise to shame and guilt do not 
appear to differ very much from one another in content or structure (Tangney, 1992; 
Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow & Wagner, 1994). This suggests that it is the 
interpretations made by an individual in a given situation that gives rise to the differing 
experiences of shame and guilt. Lewis (1971) proposed that the fundamental difference 
between shame and guilt was the focus of the evaluation of a situation. She wrote the 
following; ‘the experience of shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of 
evaluation. In guilt the self is not the central object of negative evaluation, but rather the 
thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection 
with something but is not itself the focus of the experience’ (page 30). For example, 
imagine an individual steals something from a shop. If the individual then evaluates the 
act of stealing in a negative way (negative evaluation of behaviour), then they are likely 
to feel guilt. However if they take the act of stealing as a sign that they are a worthless 
individual (negative evaluation of self) then they are likely to feel shame This view has 
been highly influential and there is now a great deal of research that supports the 
differential focus on ‘self’ and ‘behaviour’ in shame and guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002).
Shame and guilt also differ in terms of the impact they have on an individual and 
relationships. Shame is generally seen as a more painful emotion which leads individuals
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to hide and conceal their perceived inadequacies. Guilt on the other hand usually has a 
much less global impact on the individual because its focus is normally on a specific 
behaviour rather then the self as a whole. Subsequently individuals are much more likely 
to want to confess and make reparations for their behaviour than hide and conceal their 
actions (as seen in shame). Tangney and Dearing (2002) talk about ‘the dark side of 
shame’ but see guilt as much less pathological. For example, research has shown that 
shame but not guilt is associated with hostility and anger (e.g., Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992). The authors suggest that because shame poses a greater 
threat to an individual’s global sense of self than guilt, this subsequently leads to the 
adoption of maladaptive coping mechanisms such as avoidance and concealment, anger 
towards the self or projecting one’s negative feelings onto others. Research has also 
shown that shame is associated with a diminished ability to empathise with others, 
whereas guilt is associated with an increased ability to empathise with others (see 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002, for a review). Tangney and Dearing (2002) suggest that this 
results from the distinction between ‘self-focus’ and ‘behaviour-focus’ in shame and 
guilt respectively. For example, the focus on the self in shame means that others are 
often overlooked, whereas the focus on the behaviour in guilt makes people focus on 
what they have done to others and thus a consideration of how others might be feeling.
Shame has also been shown to play a role in a variety of psychopathologies (see section 
on Shame and PTSD below) but there is a degree of controversy about whether the same 
applies for guilt. Some studies have shown that guilt does play a role in psychopathology 
(e.g., O’Connor, Berry, Weiss & Gilbert, 2002) but Tangney and Dearing (2002) suggest 
that this is because of the overlap between shame and guilt. They show that in many
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studies an association between guilt and psychopathology is removed once guilt is 
examined independently of shame (something they term ‘shame-free’ guilt) and that in 
some cases guilt has even been shown to play a protective function. However, because 
many studies that show an association between guilt and psychopathology do not 
include a measure of shame it is not possible to ascertain if this is the case for all studies. 
On a similar note Kugler and Jones (1992) highlight that whether or not an association 
with psychopathology is found, depends on what measures of shame and guilt are used. 
Other researchers suggest that guilt only becomes pathological when it is impossible for 
an individual to make reparations for their perceived wrongdoing (e.g., Lee et al., 2001).
Shame, Humiliation and Embarrassment
Shame has also been likened to experiences of humiliation and embarrassment but again 
there are important differences between these concepts that need to be highlighted. 
Humiliation is seen to arise from situations in which an individual feels that they have 
been treated unfairly or abused in some way and that they were powerless to do anything 
to stop this (Gilbert, 1998). Thus feelings of humiliation are linked to beliefs that 
someone else is to blame for a personally damaging event and the other is seen as the 
‘bad’ one. This is in direct contrast to shame in which it is the ‘self that is seen as ‘bad’ 
or deficient in some way. The focus on the ‘bad other’ in humiliation and the sense of 
injustice manifested leads individuals to have desires to take revenge, get even and 
ruminate about the experience. Again this is in contrast to the desire to avoid and 
conceal, which shame is thought to evoke. However it is useful to note that, as discussed 
earlier, in some cases individuals may try to cope with their shame by projecting it into
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the external world and in these cases shame may also be linked to anger and blame of 
the other.
When examining the concept of embarrassment in relation to shame, Gilbert (1998) 
notes that although it is also a self-conscious emotion, it is generally considered milder 
and less pathogenic than shame. Embarrassment generally arises from specific actions or 
attributes and may lead to laughter or a humorous response (Miller, 1996). This can be 
contrasted to the more global and disabling experience of shame. Indeed, Miller and 
Tangney (1994) found that embarrassment tends to be related to surprising and trivial 
events whereas shame is related to incidents which threaten to reveal an individual’s 
‘deep-seated’ flaws.
Shame and Self-Esteem
A final distinction that needs to be made is between shame and self-esteem, which both 
involve negative evaluations of the self. Tangney and Dearing (2002) highlight that 
whereas self-esteem refers to a ‘self-evaluative construct representing how a person 
appraises him/herself, shame refers to an ‘affective state’ (p. 57). One could argue that 
shame is the affective response to low self-esteem but researchers have found that low- 
self-esteem is linked to a variety of different affective responses (e.g., depression, 
anxiety) and not just shame. Tangney and Dearing (2002) further elucidate the 
difference between shame and self-esteem by suggesting that self-esteem refers to the 
way an individual appraises him/herself in general, across situations over time, whereas 
shame is the affective response to a negative evaluation of the self that stems from a 
specific event, transgression or attribute and is thus not necessarily reflective of one’s
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general level of self-esteem. They review a number of studies that consistently show 
negative correlations between shame and self-esteem but highlight that these 
correlations are reasonably modest in size, which suggests shame and self-esteem are 
related but independent concepts. They acknowledge that shame-proneness influences 
self-esteem and vice versa but suggest that there are a variety of other factors that might 
independently affect self-esteem and shame and thus that it is reasonable to expect that 
there are individuals who are prone to experience shame but have reasonably high self­
esteem and vice versa. Drawing on Gilbert’s (1997) distinction between internal and 
external shame is also helpful when looking at the distinction between shame and self­
esteem. It would seem that while the concept of internal shame might be associated with 
self-esteem, the concept of external shame does not necessarily assume such an 
association. Indeed it is clearly possible that individuals are able to have a positive sense 
of self in the face of feeling looked down on and devalued by others.
Criticism of the conceptual difference between shame and self-esteem is perhaps in part 
related to how shame is actually measured. Many measures of shame have relied on 
global negative evaluations of the self as indicators of the experience of shame. Indeed, 
Andrews, Qian and Valentine (2002) emphasise that many measures of shame do not 
even make reference to the concept being measured (e.g., do not use the word shame). It 
is clear to see how such measures might be criticised for their potential overlap with the 
measurement of other concepts such as self-esteem. Andrews et al. (2002) designed and 
tested an alternative measure of shame (The Experience of Shame Scale) to combat 
these concerns. This measure directly makes reference to the concept of shame being 
measured (e.g., Have you felt ashamed of the sort of person you are?) and does not rely
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solely on global negative evaluations of the self. For example, the measure also includes 
questions about concealment of deficiencies and an individual’s concern about how one 
appears to others, which are both intimately linked to the experience of shame but not 
necessarily associated to self-esteem or a more general negative evaluation of the self 
(Andrews et al., 2002).
Origins and Development of Shame
Gilbert (1997, 1998) and Gilbert and McGuire (1998) take an evolutionary perspective 
on shame which pre-supposes that the mechanisms that underlie shame developed prior 
to self-consciousness and self-awareness. The evolutionary approach to shame requires 
recognition that humans have evolved specialised, psychological processing systems to 
achieve specific biosocial goals (Gilbert, 1997). These systems provide us with 
templates for forming attachments, friendships, sexual relationships and dominant and 
subordinate relationships and orient us to respond in certain ways to specific signals 
(Gilbert et al., in press). For example, these systems orient us to respond differently to 
signals of love and affection than to signals of threat and challenge. Gilbert (1997) 
suggests that shame evolved in relation to the management of threat, challenge and 
social rank/status. He suggests that shame serves the purpose of alerting others and the 
self to detrimental changes in status. For example, a typical shame response in animals is 
demonstrated by the subordinate who drops his head and cowers away from the 
dominant other, signalling that they have recognised their lowered status, and that the 
dominant other need not continue their attack. There is some evidence that humans also 
show submissive behaviour when they feel shamed, such as averting eye contact (Dixon, 
Gilbert, Huber, Gilbert & Van der Hoek, 1997). Shame thus functions to inform us that
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we have acted in a way that might provoke attack/rejection and hence it signals to us that 
we should stop doing what we are doing if we want to minimise damage and try and 
induce the attacker/shamer to de-escalate and refrain from causing us serious harm. 
Shame can therefore be viewed as an important strategy for controlling our own and 
others behaviour, which aids in the maintenance of hierarchy and balance within groups 
and ultimately enhances an individual’s inclusive fitness.
Although it has been proposed that humans have innate, psychological processing 
systems which help guide our responses, these systems are also influenced by our 
experiences. Gilbert et al. (in press) argue that in order for our innate psychological 
processing systems to be used effectively they need to have been stimulated, practised 
and elaborated. For example, if a child is not shown love and affection they will not 
have their innate capacities for feeling love and support stimulated and thus will not lay 
down emotionally supportive memories to draw on in times of stress. However 
conversely a child may have certain innate capacities over-stimulated which may also 
become problematic. For example, over-stimulation of the capacity to feel shame may 
lead to a dominance in shameful memories, which plague us in times of stress (Gilbert et 
al., in press). Our understanding of how our innate capacities are stimulated through 
experience can be aided by Baldwin’s (1992) notion of interpersonal schema (see 
Gilbert et al., in press). Baldwin (1992) proposes that people develop relational schema, 
which act as templates of how to act in self-other interactions. For example, a child who 
is constantly criticised may develop a relational schema that others are dominant and 
that they are subordinate (stimulating innate dominant-subordinate capacities). If these 
relational schema are repeatedly reinforced the child may copy these judgements into
their own self-schema. Thus how others have treated us contributes to how we learn to 
treat ourselves. The experience of shame can therefore be viewed as the result of the 
activation of shaming dominant-subordinate self-other and/or self-self schema, which is 
linked to the stimulation of innate psychological processing systems. This has important 
implications when considering the notion of shame; whilst shame was originally 
conceived as a response triggered by inter-personal activity (e.g., when one is attacked 
or rejected by others) it can now also be conceived as a response to intra-personal 
activity (e.g., when one is attacked or rejected by oneself). Thus we no longer need 
others to shame us as we can now shame ourselves. Inherent in this proposition is the 
idea that people can act out two internalised self-roles; (1) the role of the attacker and 
shamer and (2) the role of the attacked and shamed. Indeed an individual is likely to 
have a number of different internalised roles, which might be triggered in different 
situations. This will be discussed again later in relation to the concept of ‘inner 
dialogues’ presented below.
Shame and PTSD
Shame is now considered one of the most powerful human emotions and is seen as one 
of the major factors in the development of a range of psychopathologies (Kaufman, 
1989). For example, shame has been shown to play a role in depression (Andrews, 1995; 
Gilbert et al., 1994), social anxiety (Gilbert & Trower, 1990), alcoholism (Brown, 1991), 
hostility (Tangney et al., 1992) and narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Wurmser, 
1987). In addition the experience of shame for many individuals with PTSD is being 
increasingly recognised (Andrews et al., 2000; Brewin et al., 2000; Grey et al., 2001; 
Grey et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2005; Lee et al., in preparation; Lee et al., 2001).
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Brewin et al. (2000) found in his sample of individuals with PTSD, that there were a 
number who did not report experiencing strong emotions of fear, helplessness and horror 
but did report feelings of shame and anger with others, which independently affected 
PTSD. Similarly, Andrews et al. (2000) found that shame independently predicted PTSD 
at one month and six months post trauma, and Lee et al. (in preparation) have 
specifically identified a subgroup of people whose severity of PTSD was associated with 
the severity of shame they experienced.
As mentioned earlier, the emotional experiences associated with PTSD can be thought of 
as either primary emotions, which occur at the time of the trauma or secondary emotions 
that occur as a result of cognitive appraisals subsequent to the trauma. Although shame 
has most often been conceived as a secondary emotion in PTSD it is also possible that it 
could be experienced as a primary emotion at the time of the trauma (Lee et al., 2001). If 
one draws on Gilbert’s (1997, 1998) evolutionary view, in which shame is seen as a 
defensive strategy mobilised in situations of threat and challenge it becomes easy to 
imagine that feelings of shame could be evoked at the time of a trauma. Grey et al.
(2002) note that clinical experience of working with individuals with PTSD indicates 
that emotions other than fear are also experienced at the time of the trauma. Indeed,
Grey et al. (2001) and Holmes et al. (2005) investigated the emotions contained in 
‘hotspots’ of trauma memory and found that as well as fear, helplessness and horror, 
patients also reported a range of other emotions, including anger, sadness and shame. 
Drawing on Brewin et al.’s (1996) notion of SAMs and Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive model of PTSD, shame as a primary emotion would be seen to be stored in a 
fragmented, sensory trauma memory which would not have been adequately integrated
in the autobiographical memory system. Thus shame as a primary emotion would be 
primarily experienced in relation to flashbacks and re-experiencing symptoms.
Shame as a secondary emotion results from cognitive appraisals following a trauma, as 
an individual tries to make sense of what has happened to them. Cognitive appraisals 
that lead to shame might relate to what happened to an individual during the trauma, the 
symptoms of PTSD they are subsequently experiencing or the process of having to 
disclose details of the trauma and their actions. Whether shame is a primary or 
secondary emotion in PTSD has important implications for treatment. For example, 
cognitive restructuring for secondary shame reactions is recommended before exposure 
takes place. This is because the experience of shame can seriously reduce the 
effectiveness or can even be counter-productive to exposure, because the re-lived event 
is continuously interpreted through the activated shame schema. However cognitive 
restructuring for primary shame reactions is best done during exposure (see Grey et al., 
2002) because these reactions are stored within the fragmented and un-integrated trauma 
memory, which needs to be activated in order that cognitive restructuring can take place. 
It must be noted however that it is likely that many individuals experience shame as both 
a primary and secondary emotion and thus a mixture of cognitive restructuring both 
prior to and during exposure might be necessary.
Lee et al. (2001) propose a clinical model of shame-based PTSD, which highlights the 
role of pre-existing schemas. They suggest that when the meaning of the trauma relates 
to a loss of status, reduced social attractiveness or a sense of being attacked and this 
matches a deeper meaning about the self (schema congruence) core shame schemas are
35
activated, leading to the experience of high levels of shame and highly charged shame- 
based trauma memories. This typically leads to avoidance of all things trauma related 
and a subsequent arrest in emotional processing. However when this meaning does not 
match a deeper meaning about the self (schema incongruence), the resulting emotional 
reaction is more likely to be that of humiliation, with the individual experiencing highly 
charged humiliation-based trauma memories. The sense of self is left relatively intact 
with blame being assigned to others. However in some cases of schema incongruence, 
shame may result if the traumatic event is so devastating that new maladaptive schemas 
are created, which replace pre-existing schemas. Lee et al. (2001) additionally propose a 
guilt-based model of PTSD, which similarly looks at the relationship with underlying 
schemas. In contrast to the shame based model which focuses on individuals feeling 
devalued, attacked and a loss of social attractiveness the focus in the guilt based model 
is that an individual feels that they have acted in a way that departs from acceptable 
standards and that they are responsible for damage/harm caused. According to this 
model if these beliefs activate underlying schema (schema congruence) then this will 
lead to pervasive feelings of guilt (and also possibly inter-linked shame). However if 
these beliefs are schema incongruent the experience will be of circumscribed guilt for 
the specific trauma event. In both cases intrusive images are likely to be charged with 
guilt but in the case of the activation of underlying schemas the possibility of inter­
linked shame means that individuals are more likely to want to conceal and avoid their 
wrongdoings. In the case of schema incongruence however, the circumscribed nature of 
the guilt is more likely to motivate people to confess, and make reparations and this 
often leads to rumination of how they might have acted differently.
36
PTSD associated with high levels of shame can also be interpreted using Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. According to this model PTSD results when 
individuals process the trauma/trauma sequelae in a way that causes them to experience 
an ongoing sense of current threat. Shame can be seen as causing an ongoing sense of 
current threat in that it attacks an individual’s positive internal sense of self and 
threatens their psychological integrity. It leaves an individual feeling attacked, devalued, 
or unattractive either in the eyes of others or themselves which means their sense of self 
as a valued and attractive person is constantly under threat. As well as affecting PTSD 
directly through the generation of ongoing current threat, shame may also affect PTSD 
indirectly through the mobilisation of cognitive and behavioural strategies that inhibit or 
prevent recovery. For example, feelings of shame are associated with desires to conceal 
and hide perceived deficiencies, making is less likely that an individual would seek 
social support, ask for help or work through the trauma memories themselves. As stated 
in Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD, this type of avoidance means 
that the trauma is unlikely to be adequately processed and that evidence that disconfirms 
negative beliefs about the self is not discovered, and thus PTSD symptoms are 
maintained.
In sum, shame has been shown to be a very powerful emotion that plays a role in a range 
of psychopathologies. Shame can be thought about in relation to the activation or 
creation of dominant-subordinate self-self schema, which suggests that people can act 
out two internalised self-roles; (1) the attacker/shamer and (2) the attacked/shamed. This 
introduces the idea that individual’s might have different ‘inner voices’ which can
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engage in dialogue with one another. These ideas will be discussed further in the section 
below.
Inner Dialogues 
The Concept of Inner Dialogues
For some, the idea of an internalised ‘inner voice’ (Gilbert, 2000; Hermans, 1996) may 
conjure up images of individuals suffering from a psychotic illness and at one level this 
would be accurate. Psychosis can be seen at one end of a continuum in which 
individuals have lost the ability to distinguish between voices heard in the external world 
and their own inner voice (Gilbert, 2000). However the notion of an inner voice as an 
ordinary part of human experience becomes apparent when considering the types of 
phrases that are used in every day conversations. For example, one regularly hears 
phrases such as ‘I was just talking to myself’, ‘I was thinking out loud’, ‘I have all these 
thoughts running inside my head’ and on a more severe level ‘I’ve been beating myself 
up [with my critical thoughts] ’. Indeed, Gilbert et al. (2004) make reference to an 
interview by Tim Adams with Billy Connolly, the famous Scottish comedian, who 
recalls hearing an internal voice talking to him inside a floatation tank, which said in 
response to some future plans he was thinking about, ‘No, you 7/ never do that. No 
you ’re not good enough...’ (p. 32). This is a good illustration of how critical our inner 
voices can be, even if one is highly successful. The degree to which people feel they 
have actually heard an ‘inner voice’ is likely to vary and indeed the notion of an inner 
voice in many cases should be taken as a metaphor for an individual’s thoughts, 
cognitions and internal images. This links closely with the notion of automatic thoughts 
used in cognitive therapy (Beck, 1995) but can also be linked with concepts used in
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other theoretical orientations too. For example, in psychoanalytic theory Freud (1917) 
wrote about the superego delivering attacks against the ego, which conjures up the idea 
of an internal attacking part of the self and an internal attacked part of the self.
Although the examples cited above have mainly made reference to a self-critical inner 
voice it is clear that an individual’s inner voice is not consistent in either content or tone. 
For example, an individual’s inner voice might be caring and nurturing (‘Take it easy 
today’), forgiving ( ‘Don’t worry, you’re only human’) motivating (‘Come on -  just keep 
going for a bit longer’) or self-critical (‘You’re useless!’). It would thus seem more 
appropriate to conceptualise individuals as having a variety of different ‘inner voices’ 
which are mobilised in different situations, rather than having just one stable and 
predictable inner voice. Indeed Gilbert (2000) notes that ‘the social nature of the internal 
world gives rise to a plurality of possible selves’ (p. 125) and Hermans (1996) suggests 
that different parts of the self are likely to have different voices. The idea of multiple 
inner voices gives rise to the notion of ‘inner dialogue’; that an individual’s different 
inner voices can converse with each other internally. It can thus be conceived that there 
may be conflict and competition between different inner voices. For example, whilst 
cleaning the house an individual’s caring inner voice might tell the self to ‘take a break 
and relax’ but then their motivating voice might step in and tell the self to ‘carry on and 
finish the job now!’. Indeed Hermans (1996) highlights that there is likely to be some 
competition between our different inner voices and that some may be dominant and 
hostile whilst other will be submissive and hardly heard.
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Origins and Development of Inner Dialogues
Just as the origin and development of shame was explored in relation to evolutionary 
psychology and relational schemas the origin and development of the inner voice and 
inner dialogues can also be explored in this way too. As discussed earlier Gilbert (1997) 
suggests that humans have evolved specialised, psychological processing systems, which 
act as guides on how to achieve specific biosocial goals (e.g., forming attachments). The 
degree to which an individual has access to these different systems depends on the 
degree to which these systems have been stimulated in early life. One way of thinking 
about the representation of these systems is in terms of Baldwin’s (1992) notion of 
interpersonal schema which act as templates of how to act in self-other interactions (see 
Gilbert et al., 2004). However with the development of consciousness human beings 
developed the capacity to relate with themselves and thus humans are also seen as 
having intrapersonal schemas too, which act as templates for self-self interactions. This 
notion suggests that individuals can act out a number of different internal roles, each of 
which can be conceived as having a different inner voice. For example, if a dominant- 
subordinate self-self schema is activated, this might lead to a self-critical inner voice 
attacking another part of the self (e.g., ‘You are no good at anything’). This might then 
activate the subordinate inner voice which admits defeat and agrees with the criticism 
being made (e.g., ‘It’s true, I really am useless’). This particular type of interaction has 
been referred to as topdog -  underdog by Gestalt therapists (Greenberg, 1979) and is a 
clear example of inner dialogue between different inner voices.
Gilbert (1997) suggests that although many researchers treat self-critical dialogue as a 
unitary construct, there may in fact be many different forms and functions of self­
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criticism. For example, he suggests that individuals might criticize themselves in order 
to try and improve themselves, to motivate themselves, to prevent themselves from 
making errors in the future or as a form of self-hatred. Gilbert et al. (2004) suggest that 
the different forms and functions of self-criticism might have evolved from different 
strategies for regulating interpersonal relationships. They suggest that self-critical 
thinking that aims to facilitate self-improvement might have evolved from strategies 
aimed at the coercion of subordinates. For example, the coercion of subordinates 
involves regulating the behaviour of others and stopping them acting in a way that 
would be detrimental. Gilbert et al. (2004) suggest that this type of interaction might be 
internalised into our own relationships with ourselves through our early experiences of 
parents/carers treating us in this way. Indeed parents are often critical of their children as 
a means of trying to help them improve (e.g., ‘Your hand writing is too messy’ or 
‘You’re not working hard enough’). In contrast Gilbert et al. (2004) propose that self- 
critical thinking that is more persecutory and destructive in nature might have evolved 
from strategies aimed at controlling enemies or the ‘out-group’. They suggest that these 
kinds of strategies are focused on attacking and destroying a hated other or perceived 
contaminant rather than changing subordinate behaviour. This kind of relating to the self 
is likely to be internalised through exposure to early experiences of abuse in which the 
child is attacked and criticised in this way by parents or carers (e.g., ‘You are a 
disgusting and bad child’).
While the self-critical inner voice tends to be activated in situations when we feel we 
have failed, been devalued and/or lost attractiveness, and the resulting experience is 
often submission, it has been suggested that there are other way individuals can respond
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in these situations. Gilbert (2000) suggests that self-support or compassion is one such 
alternative. He suggests that the ability to feel warmth, to reassure, to forgive and to feel 
compassion developed from evolved strategies for forming attachments, friendships and 
maintaining relationships. He suggests that just as individuals can internalise the ability 
to self-criticise, they can also internalise the ability to self-reassure and feel 
compassionate about the self. It is suggested that this is influenced by the amount of 
reassurance, understanding and compassion an individual experienced from their parents 
at times of failure and disappointment when they were younger (Gilbert et al., 2004). If 
an individual can internalise the ability to self-reassure, forgive and be compassionate 
towards the self then the resulting response is likely to be one of feeling reassured, 
understood and cared for. This can be contrasted to the feelings of defeat and submission 
elicited by self-criticism and attack. Interestingly there is now growing evidence that 
caring and supportive signals can have physiological benefits, such as improving 
immune function (Uchino, Cacioppo & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). This can be contrasted to 
research that has shown that threat displays from dominant primates can significantly 
reduce blood serotonin (5-HT) levels in subordinates, the neurotransmitter that has a 
major impact on positive mood states, regulation of sleep, appetite and arousal (Raleigh, 
McGuire, Brammer & Yuwiler, 1984).
Research on Inner Dialogues
Gilbert et al. (2004) suggest that there is clinical evidence that individuals can 
experience an internal dominant-subordinate self-self relationship and engage in inner 
dialogues. They draw on clinical material involving the Gestalt technique of the two- 
chairs (Greenberg, Elliott & Foerster, 1990; Greenberg, Rice & Elliott, 1993). Using this
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technique patients role-play their self-critical attacks on themselves from one chair and 
then change to the other chair to role-play their response to these attacks. This can be 
used to give patients an important insight into their own internal conflicts and illustrates 
the power of one’s inner dialogues. Gilbert et al. (2004) note that clinical experience of 
using the two-chair technique reveals that depressed patients often respond to their self- 
critical attacks by accepting them as valid and adopting a submissive posture in their 
chair. Whelton and Greenberg (2005) undertook a research study to investigate students’ 
responses to their own self-critical attacks using the two-chair technique. They found 
that students who were identified as high in self-criticism prior to the experiment (using 
the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire), often submitted to their own self-critical 
attacks, displayed sad and shamed facial expressions and felt that they were unable to 
defend themselves from these attacks. Greenberg et al. (1990) suggest that one of the 
major factors in the development of depression is the inability to defend oneself from 
one’s own self-attacks. Indeed there is now a range of research that suggests that self- 
criticism does play a significant role in depression. For example, Zuroff, Moskowitz and 
Cote (1999) found that self-critical thinking was linked to poor interpersonal 
relationships and depression, Murphy et al. (2002) found that self-disparagement was 
significantly associated with life-time diagnosis of depression and Teasdale and Cox 
(2001) found that individuals who had suffered from depression in their past (but had 
recovered) were significantly more likely to subsequently become self-critical when 
their mood lowered, than individuals who had not previously suffered depression. 
Another interesting study by Gilbert et al. (2001) investigated self-critical thoughts in 
individuals with depression and malevolent voices in schizophrenia. They found that the
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degree to which these thoughts/voices were experienced as dominating and powerful 
was significantly associated with depression.
Gilbert et al. (2004) investigated the concepts of self-criticism and caring and 
compassion towards the self, using a female student sample. Particular interest was paid 
to developing a questionnaire that measured an individual’s ability to be caring and 
compassionate towards the self (referred to as ‘self-reassurance’), having noted that no 
such measure currently existed. However they also wanted to develop a measure that 
investigated the different forms and functions of self-criticism. They developed two 
questionnaires; (1) Forms of self-criticizing/attacking and self-reassuring scale (FSCRS), 
(2) Functions of self-criticizing/attacking scale (FSCS). Factor analysis of the FSCRS 
showed that self-criticism and self-reassurance separated into two distinct components 
but more interestingly self-criticism also separated into another two distinct components. 
The first component of self-criticism they called ‘inadequate self which related to being 
self-critical, dwelling on mistakes and a sense of inadequacy, and the second component 
of self-criticism they called ‘hated self’ which related to desires to hurt the self and 
feelings of self-disgust. Factor analysis of the FSCS showed that the functions of self- 
criticism also separated into two components; ‘self-improving’ relating to desires to 
improve and motivate the self and ‘self-persecuting’ relating to desires to take revenge 
and harm one-self for failures. Mediation analysis suggested that this second ‘self- 
persecuting’ function was particularly pathogenic and was positively mediated by the 
‘hated self’ dimension of self-criticism and negatively mediated by self-reassurance.
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Gilbert et al. (in press) found similar results when they used these measures, finding that 
while depression was positively associated with self-critical thinking it was also 
negatively associated with self-reassurance. They concluded that it may be an inability 
to generate self-compassion and self-reassurance, as much as self-criticism that may 
contribute to psychopathology. They suggest the need to investigate self-critical thinking 
and self-reassuring thinking in other disorders. Of particular interest to this current 
review is how these concepts might be linked to shame and PTSD. These ideas will be 
explored further in the section below.
PTSD, Shame and Inner Dialogues
As suggested earlier shame is a self-conscious affect associated with feelings of 
powerlessness, inferiority and a desire to hide or conceal deficiencies. An evolutionary 
perspective sees shame as having evolved from mechanisms for social relating and in 
particular those of the dominant-subordinate relationship. It has been suggested that this 
type of relationship can be internalised into one’s own relationship with oneself, and 
thus that we no longer need others to shame us as we can now shame ourselves. The 
method by which individuals shame themselves can be thought about in relation to inner 
dialogues. For example, when individuals are faced with a situation in which they feel 
they have failed, been devalued and/or lost attractiveness various relational schema are 
likely to be activated. One possibility is that a dominant-subordinate self-self schema is 
activated, which manifests itself in the form of a self-critical inner voice, which attacks 
the part of the self that is seen as inferior and unattractive. Shame is seen to result when 
individuals submit to their own self-critical attacks. However shame is not the inevitable 
response to self-criticism. Some individuals may be able to respond to their self­
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criticism with a caring and compassionate inner voice, which aims to re-assure, 
empathise and nurture the self. Thus shame is also associated with an inability to fight 
back or re-assure and care for the self. It may be that some individuals automatically 
respond to situations in which they feel they have failed and lost attractiveness, with a 
caring and compassionate inner voice, whilst for others this response may only result 
once the self-critical inner voice has been activated (immediate caring -  cared for 
schema activation versus delayed caring -  cared for  schema activation). The latter may 
reflect the process involved for self-critical individuals in therapy, who have been taught 
techniques that will facilitate the activation of their caring and compassionate inner 
voices at times when they notice themselves becoming self-critical.
In order to address the relationship between PTSD, shame and inner dialogues it is 
helpful to return to Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. This model 
suggests that PTSD results when individuals process the trauma/trauma sequelae in a 
way that causes them to experience an ongoing sense of current threat. As suggested 
earlier shame can be seen as causing an ongoing sense of current threat in that it attacks 
an individual’s positive internal sense of self and threatens their psychological integrity, 
leaving them feeling attacked, devalued and/or unattractive either in the eyes of others or 
themselves. The notion of inner dialogues offers us a way of understanding how the 
devastating experience of shame develops for individuals with PTSD. For example, it 
can be proposed that individuals who later go on to develop PTSD associated with high 
levels of shame, are likely to have interpreted the trauma and/or its sequelae as meaning 
they have been devalued, attacked or lost social attractiveness. This then activates (or 
creates) a dominant-subordinate self -self schema which manifests itself in a self-critical
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inner voice. It can be proposed that these individuals are then unable to defend from 
themselves from their own self-critical attacks (e.g., can not access a caring, self- 
reassuring and compassionate inner voice) and thus submit and feel defeated by their 
self-critical inner voice. This then causes the individual to experience shame which 
causes/contributes to a sense of ongoing current threat and the subsequent development 
of PTSD. Shame can also be seen as maintaining PTSD in that it will continually re­
activate the self-critical inner voice and hence individuals will constantly re-shame 
themselves which perpetuates a sense of ongoing current threat. As mentioned earlier 
shame can also lead to the adoption of unhelpful cognitive and behavioural strategies 
that inhibit or prevent recovery. Although this formulation has emphasised shame as a 
major cause of current threat for individuals who suffer from PTSD associated with high 
levels of shame, shame is not seen as exclusively influencing the degree of current threat 
experienced. In line with the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) this 
formulation suggests that current threat is likely to be the result of many potentially 
interacting factors (e.g., nature of the trauma memory, other cognitive appraisals etc) but 
highlights the central role that shame is likely to play.
The relationship between PTSD, shame and inner dialogues proposed above, has a 
number of implications for treatment. In particular it suggests that individuals with 
PTSD associated with high levels of shame, might benefit from therapeutic techniques 
that promote caring and compassion. Indeed Lee (in press) recently outlined a possible 
technique that can be used to help patients develop inner caring and compassion, which 
can be used alongside traditional cognitive behavioural therapy for trauma. This 
technique involves helping clients create an image of a ‘perfect nurturer’ who is caring,
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compassionate and meets their needs perfectly. The perfect nurturer is not a prescriptive 
image and individuals are encouraged to create an image which they will find most 
helpful. The perfect nurturer is designed to activate self-soothing emotions and once 
practised can be used to re-frame negative cognitions. Lee (in press) cites a case 
example of a women suffering PTSD associated with high levels of shame and 
depression, for whom traditional cognitive therapy techniques had failed to produce an 
emotional shift. However when the same cognitive techniques were used in conjunction 
with the ‘perfect nurturer’ a significant emotional shift was achieved (reduction in 
depression score) and improvements in functioning were achieved (return to work). This 
is a good illustration of how shame and manifest current threat to psychological integrity 
may respond more effectively when strategies that promote caring and compassion are 
used alongside exposure and traditional cognitive restructuring.
Conclusions 
Summary
PTSD is traditionally associated with the emotions of fear, helplessness or horror but 
recent research has suggested other emotions may also play a role in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD (Andrews et al., 2000; Brewin et al., 2000; Grey et al., 2001; 
Grey et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2005; Lee et al., in preparation; Lee et al., 2001). 
Andrews et al. (2000) found that shame independently predicted symptoms of PTSD one 
month and six months post trauma, and Lee et al. (in preparation) have identified a 
subgroup of people who severity of PTSD was associated with the severity of shame 
they experienced. An evolutionary perspective (Gilbert 1997, 1998; Gilbert & McGuire, 
1998) suggests that shame is related to an internalised dominant-subordinate relationship
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with the self, where one part of the self acts as attacker, whilst another part acts as the 
attacked. This idea suggests that individuals can have inner dialogues with themselves, 
where two different parts of the self communicate with each other. Gilbert (2000) 
suggests that clinicians can help individuals deal with self-critical inner dialogues by 
helping them develop a caring and compassionate inner voice. If these concepts are 
applied to individuals with PTSD associated with high levels of shame, it can be 
suggested that self-critical inner dialogues and the lack of a caring, reassuring and 
compassionate inner voice causes/perpetuates threat to an individual’s psychological 
integrity (shame) and thus contributes to the development and maintenance of PTSD. 
This has important implications for the type of treatment interventions that might be 
beneficial for individuals with PTSD associated with high levels of shame. Techniques 
that help individuals develop a caring, reassuring and compassionate inner voice might 
be an important adjunct to more traditional methods of exposure and cognitive re­
structuring.
Suggestions for Research
Having presented a possible formulation for the role of self-critical inner dialogues and 
the lack of self-reassuring, caring and compassionate inner dialogues in the development 
of shame in PTSD, one possible suggestion for future research would be to use the 
measures developed by Gilbert et al. (2004) described earlier (Forms of self- 
criticizing/attacking and self-reassuring scale[FSCRS]; Functions of self- 
criticizing/attacking scale [FSCS]), to investigate these relationships. The experience of 
shame scale (ESS) developed by Andrews et al. (2002) could be used as the measure of 
shame as it attempts to avoid the possible confound of measuring shame purely through
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global negative self-evaluations, which is too closely related to the concept of self- 
critical thinking. The ESS attempts to measure shame directly by making reference to 
the concept of shame being measured (e.g., Have you felt ashamed of the sort of person 
you are?) and also looks at the other qualities intimately linked to the experience of 
shame but not necessarily linked to self-criticism. For example the measure includes 
questions about concealment of deficiencies and an individual’s concern about how one 
appears to others. If a researcher had the time and the resources the ideal design for such 
as study would be prospective. For example, a researcher could recruit recently 
traumatised individuals and ask them to fill out questionnaires measuring their levels of 
self-criticism and their levels of self-reassurance and also the reasons why they criticise 
themselves (using the FSCRS and the FSCS respectively). These individuals could then 
be followed up one - six months later to establish which of them went on to develop 
PTSD, and specifically if self-criticism and a lack of self-reassurance is correlated with 
PTSD associated with high levels of shame. It might also be interesting to investigate the 
role the different forms and functions of self-criticism might play. Based on Gilbert et 
al.’s (2004) results one might predict that the ‘hated self dimension of self-criticism and 
the ‘self-persecuting’ function would be particularly pathogenic.
An alternative retrospective method would involve using the same basic design but this 
time recruiting individuals who had already developed PTSD. The advantage of using 
this method is that it does not have so many constraints on time or resources but the 
disadvantage is that one cannot establish causal relationships. For example, if a 
relationship was found between shame and self-critical thinking in a PTSD sample it 
could be argued that the experience of PTSD associated with high levels of shame leads
to self-critical thinking, rather than as we propose that a propensity to self-criticise is one 
of the components that contributes to the development of PTSD associated with high 
levels of shame. However, whether a prospective or retrospective design was used it 
would be anticipated that this kind of research would have important implications for 
treatment approaches for this client group.
In sum it seems that an evolutionary perspective on shame and the exploration of inner 
dialogues is a promising area for future research within the field of PTSD. It will not 
only enhance the current knowledge base but hopefully will also contribute to the 
development of new and complementary treatment approaches for PTSD, such as 
interventions that focus on inner caring and compassion. Helping-individuals create or 
access a caring and compassionate part of the self is likely to prove beneficial in the 
treatment of a whole range of disorders, especially those associated with shame, and as a 
consequence is likely be an area of growing research.
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Part 2: Empirical Paper
The Role of Shame and Self-Critical Thinking in the Development and 
Maintenance of Current Threat in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
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Abstract
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has traditionally been associated with the emotions 
of fear, helplessness and horror. However there is increasing recognition of other 
emotions in PTSD and recent research has looked at the role of shame. Cognitive theory 
has suggested that PTSD is caused by a traumatic experience being processed in a way 
that causes ongoing current threat. Following from the ideas of Ehlers and Clark (2000), 
this study suggests that shame might contribute to the creation/maintenance of ongoing 
current threat as it attacks an individual’s psychological integrity, leaving them feeling 
inferior, socially unattractive and powerless. This study used a correlational design to 
investigate some of the factors that might be contributing to a shame response within a 
PTSD sample. It was hypothesised that individuals with PTSD who report higher levels 
of shame would be more prone to engage in self-critical thinking and less prone to 
engage in self-reassuring thinking than individuals with PTSD who report lower levels 
of shame, and that these relationships would be independent of levels of depression.
Data were gathered using self-report questionnaires sent to patients on the assessment or 
treatment waiting lists at clinics offering treatment for PTSD. Results showed that shame 
was positively associated with self-criticism and negatively associated with self­
reassurance. However once the variance due to depression and symptom severity was 
accounted for, only the relationship between shame and self-criticism remained 
significant. Results are discussed in relation to the role shame might play in generating 
current threat in PTSD and the implications this research has for treatment.
63
Introduction
The key emotions currently associated with the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) are fear, helplessness and horror (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). However recent research has shown that other emotions also play a 
role in PTSD. For instance, Grey, Holmes and Brewin (2001) and Holmes, Grey and 
Young (2005) investigated the emotions contained in ‘hotspots’ of trauma memory 
(peak moments of emotional distress) and found that as well as fear, helplessness and 
horror, patients also reported a range of other emotions, including anger, sadness and 
shame. Brewin, Andrews and Rose (2000) described a number of individuals with PTSD 
who did not report experiencing strong emotions of fear, helplessness or horror but did 
report feelings of shame and anger with others, which independently affected PTSD. 
Similarly, Andrews, Brewin, Rose and Kirk (2000) found that shame independently 
predicted PTSD symptoms at one month and six months post-trauma, in victims of 
violent crime. Lee, Grey and Reynolds (in preparation) have also identified a sub-group 
of treatment-seeking individuals, whose severity of PTSD was related to the severity of 
shame they reported.
Understanding the role that shame might play in PTSD can be aided by Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. This model proposes that persistent PTSD 
only develops if individuals process the trauma/trauma sequelae in a way that causes 
them to experience a sense of ongoing current threat. Although fear is the emotion that 
corresponds most readily with the notion of threat in PTSD, the cognitive model of 
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) allows attention to be paid to other emotions and the role 
these might play in the development of ongoing current threat. For example, Ehlers and
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Clark (2000) suggest that current ongoing threat can be seen as external, such as seeing 
the world as a more dangerous place (fear), or internal, such as seeing oneself as a less 
capable or acceptable human being (shame). Shame can be seen as causing internal 
current threat in that it attacks an individual’s psychological integrity leaving them 
feeling inferior, socially unattractive and powerless. It can therefore be proposed that for 
some individuals PTSD is not necessarily maintained by fear but rather it is maintained 
by shame.
Given the central role shame appears to play in PTSD for some individuals, it is 
important that research starts to explore some of the different factors that might 
contribute to the generation and maintenance of shame in this disorder. This could help 
the development of treatment interventions tailored to the specific needs of this client 
group. One approach that offers important insights into the origins and development of 
shame is the psycho-evolutionary approach (Gilbert, 1997, 1998; Gilbert & McGuire,
1998). This approach suggests that shame evolved prior to self-consciousness, in relation 
to the management of threat, challenge and social/rank status. It is suggested that the 
function of shame is to alert the self and others to detrimental changes in status, 
provoking a submissive response in the shamed and hopefully a subsequent de- 
escalation in attack from the shamer (Gilbert, 1997). Shame thus evolved as a strategy 
to keep the self safe. A typical shame response in animals is demonstrated by the 
subordinate who drops his head and cowers away from the dominant other, signalling 
that they have recognised their lowered status, and that the dominant need not continue 
their attack. However with the development of self-consciousness humans have evolved
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the capacity to have a relationship with the self, and thus we no longer need others to 
shame us as we can also shame ourselves.
Inherent in this proposition is the idea that individuals can act out a number of different 
internal roles and can therefore engage in internal dialogues with the self. Gilbert,
Clarke, Hempel, Miles and Irons (2004) suggest that there is clinical evidence that 
individuals can engage in dialogue with the self and can experience an internal 
dominant-subordinate self-self relationship (self-critical inner dialogues), which can 
produce feelings such as shame. They draw on clinical material involving the Gestalt 
technique of the two-chairs (Greenberg, Elliott & Foerster, 1990; Greenberg, Rice & 
Elliott, 1993). Using this technique patients role-play their self-critical attacks on 
themselves from one chair and then change to the other chair to role-play their response 
to these attacks. Gilbert et al. (2004) note that clinical experience of using the two-chair 
technique reveals that depressed patients often respond to their own self-critical attacks 
by accepting them as valid and adopting a submissive posture in their chair. Indeed there 
is now a range of research that suggests that self-criticism does play a significant role in 
depression (Murphy et al., 2002; Teasdale & Cox, 2001; Zuroff, Moskowitz & Cote,
1999).
While self-criticism tends to be activated in situations when we feel we have failed, been 
devalued and/or lost attractiveness (as is the case for some survivors of trauma), it has 
been suggested that there are other ways individuals can respond in these situations. 
Gilbert (2000) suggests that self-support or compassion is one such alternative. He 
suggests that the ability to feel warmth, to reassure, to forgive and to feel compassion
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developed from evolved strategies for forming attachments, friendships and maintaining 
relationships. He suggests that just as individuals can internalise the ability to self- 
criticise, they can also internalise the ability to self-reassure and feel compassionate 
about the self. If an individual can internalise the ability to self-reassure, forgive and be 
compassionate towards the self then the resulting response is likely to be one of feeling 
reassured, understood and cared for. This can be contrasted to the feelings of defeat and 
submission elicited by self-criticism and attack. Interestingly there is now growing 
evidence that caring and supportive signals can have physiological benefits, such as 
improving the function of the cardiovascular, endocrine and immune systems (Uchino, 
Cacioppo & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996).
In order to measure some these concepts Gilbert et al. (2004) developed two new 
questionnaires, using a female student sample. The first questionnaire measured self- 
criticism and self-reassurance and separated into three separate components: (1) self- 
criticism; inadequate self (being self-critical, dwelling on mistakes and a sense of 
inadequacy) (2) self-criticism; hated self (desires to hurt the self and feelings of self­
disgust) and (3) self-reassurance (positive and warm disposition to the self). The second 
questionnaire measured the functions of self-criticism and separated into two separate 
components: (1) self-improving (desires to improve and motivate the self) and (2) self- 
persecuting (desires to take revenge and harm the self for failures). Mediation analysis 
suggested that this second ‘self-persecuting’ function was particularly pathogenic and 
was positively mediated by the ‘hated self’ dimension of self-criticism and negatively 
mediated by self-reassurance. Gilbert, Baldwin, Irons, Baccus and Palmer (in press) also 
used these measures and found that while depression was positively associated with self-
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critical thinking it was negatively associated with self-reassurance. They concluded that 
it might be an inability to generate self-compassion and self-reassurance, as much as 
self-criticism that may contribute to psychopathology.
If one applies these ideas to the experience of shame within PTSD it can be hypothesised 
that individuals who develop PTSD associated with high levels of shame, are likely to 
have interpreted the trauma and/or its sequelae as meaning that they have been devalued, 
attacked or lost social attractiveness. This may then reinforce/activate or create a 
dominant-subordinate self-self relationship which manifests itself in self-criticism. It 
can be proposed that these individuals are then unable to defend themselves from their 
own self-critical attacks (e.g., cannot self-reassure and be compassionate to the self) and 
thus submit and feel defeated. This then causes the individual to experience shame 
which causes/contributes to a sense of ongoing current threat central to the development 
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Shame can also be seen to maintain PTSD in that it 
will continually re-activate self-criticism and hence individuals will constantly re-shame 
themselves, perpetuating a sense of ongoing current threat.
This current study explored self-criticism, self-reassurance and shame in individuals 
referred for treatment for PTSD. It was hypothesised that; (1) self-criticism and shame 
would have a positive association, (2) self-reassurance and shame would have a negative 
association, (3) the ‘hated self component of self-criticism would have a stronger 
association with shame than the ‘inadequate self’ component, (4) the ‘self-persecuting’ 
function of self-criticism would have a stronger association with shame than the ‘self­
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improvement’ function of self-criticism (5) the relationships described above would be 
independent of levels of depression.
Method 
Participants
Participants were 37 patients referred for treatment for PTSD, recruited from five 
outpatient services within the U.K. National Health Service. 157 patients were invited to 
take part, giving a 24% uptake rate. Inclusion criteria were that participants were 
experiencing significant posttraumatic symptoms (based on Posttraumatic Stress 
Diagnostic Scale or clinician’s judgment). Patients were not invited to take part in the 
research if they had an insufficient command of English to complete the questionnaires 
or if they had a current psychotic illness. The sample consisted of 20 (54%) women and 
17 (46%) men. Their mean age was 37 (range 21 -  56). They were from a range of 
ethnic backgrounds; White British (n = 19; 51%), White Irish (n = 3; 8%), White Other 
(n = 2; 5%), Black African (n = 1; 3%), Black Other (n = 1; 3%), Indian (n = 1; 3%) and 
Other (n = 4; 11%). There were missing data on ethnicity for 6 patients (16%).
In order to assess volunteer bias, patients who did not volunteer were compared to 
patients who did volunteer; no significant differences in age (t [133] = -0.48, p = 0.63) 
or gender (x2 [1] = 0.08, p = 0.78) were found. It was not possible to ascertain reasons 
why patients did not volunteer, as it was made clear on the patient information sheet that 
patients did not have to give reasons for not taking part in the study and that refusal 
would not affect the care they received at the clinic.
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Procedure
Patients on the assessment and/or treatment waiting lists at five outpatient services 
offering treatment for PTSD were sent an optional research pack in the post. This 
consisted of an invitation letter, patient information sheet, consent form and the 
questionnaires outlined below. The research pack also contained three questionnaires 
from another related study. Patients were offered payment of £6 for returning completed 
questionnaires. Patients agreeing to take part in the research were asked to sign the 
consent form and complete the questionnaires and then either send them back in the 
stamped addressed envelope provided or return them to their clinician at their next 
appointment. Some patients were followed up with a phone call to find out whether or 
not they wanted to take part in the research. Patients could let us know that they did not 
want to take part in the research by filling out an opt-out slip on the patient invitation 
letter and returning it to us in a postage page envelope. Interestingly no patients filled 
out an opt-out slip.
In some cases participants had already filled out some of the questionnaires used in this 
current study (.Beck Depression Inventory and Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale) as 
part of the assessment process at the outpatient service they were attending. Therefore in 
some cases there is a lag between the date participants filled out these questionnaires and 
the rest of the questionnaires used in this study. Across the whole sample the mean delay 
between measures was 3 weeks (range 0 -  13).
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The research was approved by Camden and Islington Community Health Services Local 
Research Ethics Committee and Oxfordshire Research Ethics Committee. Confirmation 
letters of approval are given in Appendix 1. The patient invitation letter, patient 
information sheet and consent form are given in Appendix 2.
Measures
The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa, 1995).
This measure was designed to assist with the diagnosis of PTSD. It is a 49 item paper 
and pencil self-report instrument based on the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) diagnostic criteria for PTSD (now DSM-IV-TR, criteria unchanged). 
A diagnosis of PTSD is only recommended if all six of the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD 
are endorsed. The first section of the PDS requires respondents to indicate any traumatic 
events they have experienced or witnessed from a checklist of 12 traumatic events, 
including an ‘other’ category. Respondents are then asked to indicate the traumatic event 
that ‘bothers them the most’ and then answer questions assessing whether this event 
involved physical injury to self or others, concerns that their own or others life were in 
danger and whether they felt helpless or terrified during the event (Criterion A). The 
next section requires respondents to answer 17 questions corresponding to the symptoms 
of PTSD: re-experiencing symptoms (Criterion B); avoidance/numbing symptoms 
(Criterion C); and arousal symptoms (Criterion D). Summation of the scores on all 17 
symptom questions yields a symptom severity score. The final section of the PDS 
assesses whether the respondent has experienced symptoms for over 1 month (Criterion
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E) and whether the symptoms have caused disruption to an individual’s functioning 
(Criterion F).
Foa, Cashman, Jaycox and Perry (1997) demonstrated that the PDS has high internal 
consistency and good test-retest reliability using a clinical population aged between 18 - 
65 years. They also demonstrated the validity of the PDS by showing high levels of 
diagnostic agreement with a clinical interview assessing PTSD (Structured Clinical 
Interview for the DSM-III-R; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbons & First, 1990) and strong 
correlations with other measures of trauma-related psychopathology.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).
This is a well established measure of depression, consisting of 21 self-report items 
measuring cognitive, affective and vegetative symptoms of depression. It has been 
shown to have good reliability and validity (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988).
The Experience of Shame Scale (ESS: Andrews, Qian & Valentine, 2002; Appendix 
3).
This measure is based on a previous interview measure by Andrews and Hunter (1997). 
It is a 25 item questionnaire that assesses characterological shame, behavioural shame 
and bodily shame and also yields a total shame score. Questions address three core 
components: (1) an experiential component addressing whether an individual felt shame, 
for example, ‘Have you felt ashamed o f the sort o f person you are?’, (2) a cognitive
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component addressing concerns about what others think, for example, ‘Have you 
worried about what other people think o f the sort o f person you are?’, and (3) a 
behavioural component addressing avoidance and concealment, for example, ‘Have you 
tried to conceal from others the sort of person you are?’. Participants respond according 
to how they have felt in the past year and each item is rated on a 4-point scale, ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Andrews et al. (2002) demonstrated that the ESS 
has good validity (correlation with other shame scales), high internal consistency and 
good test-retest reliability, for both the total scale and the sub-scales.
The Forms o f Self -Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale (FSCRS: Gilbert 
et al. 2004; Appendix 4).
This measure consists of 22 items examining how self-critical/attacking or how 
supportive/reassuring people are when things go wrong for them. Participants are 
presented with the following probe statement, ‘When things go wrong for me. 
followed by 22 items. Participants then rate each item using a 5-point Likert scale 
(ranging from 0 = not at all like me, to 4 = extremely like me). Gilbert et al., (2004) 
conducted a principal components analysis which indicated that the scale consisted of 
three sub-scales; (1) inadequate self, which relates to feeling internally put-down, 
inadequate and defeated (2) hated self, which relates to feelings of anger and disgust 
towards the self and (3) reassured self (or trait self-reassurance), which relates to a 
positive and warm disposition to the self and. The inadequate self and hated self 
components can be combined to create one score (self-criticism total), which has been 
called trait self-criticism. It is important to note that individuals can theoretically score
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high on self-criticism and high on self-reassurance as these components are not simply 
opposite ends of a unitary construct. Gilbert et al. (2004) reported good internal 
consistency for these components and good convergent and discriminant validity.
The Functions o f Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale (FSCS: Gilbert et al. 2004; 
Appendix 5).
This measure consists of 21 items examining the functions of why people self-criticise. 
Participants are presented with the following probe statement, T get critical and angry 
with myself.. followed by 21 questions reflecting possible reasons for self-criticism. 
Participants are required to respond on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 0 = not at all 
like me, to 4 = extremely like me). Gilbert et al. (2004) conducted a principal 
components analysis, which indicated two sub-scales; (1) self-improving/correction, 
which relates to desires to self-improve and (2) self-persecuting/harming, which relates 
to desires to take revenge, harm or hurt the self for failures. Gilbert et al. (2004) reported 
good internal consistency for these components.
Results
This section will begin by presenting the characteristics of the traumatic experiences and 
posttraumatic symptoms reported by the participants in this study. The descriptive 
statistics of the questionnaires will then be explored, followed by an inspection of the 
structure of the questionnaires. Correlational analyses and hierarchical multiple 
regression will then be presented to test the hypotheses of this study. This will be 
followed by exploratory analyses.
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Skewness and kurtosis were examined for all variables in order to check for normal 
distributions. As most variables did not have normal distributions, non-parametric 
analyses were used to analyse the data. However multiple regression analyses were 
performed using parametric tests because there is not a non-parametric equivalent. All 
tests are performed at the two-tailed level, except where there is a directional hypothesis, 
in which case one-tailed tests are used. In order to control for Type 1 error, tests were 
conducted at p < 0.01.
Characteristics of Traumatic Experiences and Posttraumatic Symptoms
All participants reported that they had experienced a traumatic event. The frequencies of 
traumatic events reported are outlined below in Table 1. Of the 37 participants 34 were 
given a full diagnosis of PTSD. This was established using the PDS and through 
discussion with clinicians involved in the case. The 3 participants who did not meet full 
diagnostic criteria, all reported significant re-experiencing symptoms and were judged 
by clinicians to be suffering significant posttraumatic symptoms. Of the 37 participants 
30 had been experiencing their symptoms for more than 3 months (chronic), 5 had 
experienced their symptoms between 1 - 3  months (acute), and there were missing data 
for 2 participants. 23 of the participants started experiencing their symptoms less than 6 
months after the traumatic event, 10 started experiencing their symptoms over 6 months 
after the traumatic event (delayed reaction), and there was missing data for 4 
participants.
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Table 1. Index Traumas Reported by Participants
Index Traumas Frequency (%)
Serious accident, fire or explosion 14 (38%)
Sexual assault; known assailant 6 (16%)
Non-sexual assault; stranger 5 (13%)
Sexual contact under 18 4 (11%)
Sexual assault; stranger 2 (5%)
Imprisonment 1 (3%)
Life threatening illness 1 (3%)
Other 4 (11%)
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 gives the means and standard deviations for the questionnaires used in this 
current study and those obtained from non-clinical student samples. The mean PDS 
symptom severity score for this sample (32. 46, SD = 12.06) was similar to that obtained 
from another study (33.59, SD = 9.96) using a large sample of participants suffering 
PTSD (Foa et al., 1997). Indeed analysis showed that these scores did not differ 
significantly from each other (z = 0.45, p = 0.65).
The mean BDI score places this sample in the moderate range for depression (Kendall, 
Hollon, Beck, Hammen & Ingram, 1987) and was greater than the mean BDI score for 
the non-clinical sample. The mean shame scores on the ESS for this current sample were 
greater than the non-clinical sample, except for the bodily shame sub-component where
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Questionnaires Used in This Current Study and Those Obtained From a Non-Clinical Sample
Current Study Non-Clinical Sample a
M SD M SD z P
PDS: Symptom Severity Score 32.46 12.06 na na na na
BDI: Depression 27.23 10.68 5.90 7.50 11.66 <0.001
ESS: Characterological Shame 31.86 10.75 24.43 7.25 4.21 < 0.001
Behavioural Shame 26.16 7.33 21.25 5.50 3.70 <0.001
Bodily Shame 10.88 4.25 9.82 3.40 1.52 = 0.13
Total Shame 68.90 19.59 55.58 13.95 4.14 <0.001
FSCRS: Inadequate Self 22.73 9.27 16.75 8.44 3.93 <0.001
Hated Self 7.79 5.54 3.86 4.58 4.32 <0.001
Self-Criticism Total 30.52 13.41 20.61 12.03 4.50 <0.001
Self-Reassurance 13.94 6.54 19.81 5.92 5.87 < 0.001
FSCS: Self-Improving 20.35 11.22 19.27 11.10 0.57 = 0.57
Self-Persecuting 8.26 8.28 4.80 6.43 2.46 = 0.02
Note: N’s ranged from 34 to 37; PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; ESS = Experience of Shame Scale; FSCRS = The Forms of Self-
Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale; FSCS = The Functions of Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale.
a Non-clinical sample; means for ESS taken from Andrews et al. (2002), means for FSCRS and FSCS taken from Gilbert et al. (2004) and mean 
for BDI taken from O’Connor, Berry, Weiss & Gilbert (2002).
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no significant difference in scores was found. The mean inadequate self, hated self and 
self-criticism total scores of the FSCRS were also greater in this current sample 
compared to the non-clinical sample, while the mean self-reassurance component of the 
FSCRS was lower. The mean self-persecuting component of the FSCS was higher than 
that of the non-clinical sample at the p < 0.05 level, but did not reach significance at the 
p < 0.01 level adopted. There was not a significant difference between the mean self- 
improving component of the FSCS for this sample and the non-clinical sample.
Structure of Questionnaires
The Experience of Shame Scale (ESS)
The three subscales of the ESS (characterological shame, behavioural shame and bodily 
shame) were moderately to highly inter-correlated; correlations ranged from 0.40 to 0.83 
(correlations between all variables are presented in Table 3). The three shame sub-scales 
were therefore not explored further separately and subsequent analyses used the total 
shame score (highly correlated with all three sub-scales).
The Forms of Self-Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale (FSCRS)
The inadequate self and hated self components of self-criticism were highly correlated 
(correlation of 0.59). However it was theoretically important to examine these 
components separately as well as using the self-criticism total score (aggregate of these 
two components). The self-criticism total score was highly correlated with the 
inadequate self and the hated self components (correlations of 0.91 and 0.85 
respectively). The self-reassurance component was moderately to highly negatively
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Table 3. Correlations Between all Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
(1) PDS: Symptom Severity Score
(2) BDI: Depression 0.84**
(3) ESS: Characterological Shame 0.49* 0.60**
(4) ESS: Behavioural Shame 0.36 0.49* 0.83**
(5) ESS: Bodily Shame 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.43*
(6) ESS: Total Shame 0.45* 0.57** 0.93** 0.93** 0.60**
(7) FSCRS: Inadequate Self 0.31 0.44* 0.68** 0.74** 0.37 0.72**
(8) FSCRS: Hated Self 0.60** 0.74** 0.71** 0.61** 0.49* 0.68** 0.59**
(9) FSCRS: Self-Criticism Total 0.52* 0.65** 0.79** 0.75** 0.49* 0.79** 0.91** 0.85**
(10) FSCRS: Self-Reassurance -0.35 -0.53** -0.35 -0.39 -0.30 -0.39* -0.42 -0.52** -0.48*
(11) FSCS: Self-Improving 0.37 0.43 0.44* 0.45* 0.23 0.46* 0.54** 0.37 0.51* -0.26
(12) FSCS: Self-Persecuting 0.54** 0.65** 0.63** 0.52* 0.46* 0.61** 0.41 0.71** 0.60** -0.45* 0.53**
Note: * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001; N’s ranged from 34 to 37; PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; ESS = Experience of Shame Scale; 
FSCRS = The Forms of Self-Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale; FSCS = The Functions of Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale.
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correlated with the inadequate self, hated self and self-criticism total scores (correlations 
ranged from -0.42 to -0.52).
The Functions o f  Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale (FSCS)
The self-improving function of self-criticism and the self-persecuting function of self 
criticism were highly positively correlated (correlation of 0.53). Theoretically these 
components cannot be added together to create a total score, and thus the components 
are examined separately.
Correlational Analyses
Correlation analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses of this study (see Table 3 for 
relevant correlations). Hypothesis 1 was supported; there was a positive correlation 
between self-criticism and shame (rs = 0.79, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2 was also 
supported; there was a negative correlation between self-reassurance and shame (rs = 
-0.39, p = 0.009). Hypothesis 3 was not supported; the hated self component of self 
criticism did not have a stronger correlation with shame (rs = 0.68, p < 0.001) than the 
inadequate self component (rs = 0.72, p < 0.001). In fact the inadequate self component 
seemed slightly larger, although this did not prove statistically significant (z = 0.16, p = 
0.44). Hypothesis 4 was also not supported. The self-persecuting function of self- 
criticism did seem to have a stronger correlation with shame (rs = 0.61, p < 0.001) 
compared to the self-improving function of self-criticism (rs = 0.46, p = 0.002), but the 
difference did not reach statistical significance (z = 0.8, p = 0.21).
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Hypothesis 5 was tested using hierarchical multiple regression (see Table 4). As well as 
controlling for depression, posttraumatic symptom severity was also controlled for in the 
analyses. Two regression models were used to predict the variables outlined in the 
hypotheses:
Model 1; Depression and Posttraumatic Symptom Severity
Model 2; Depression, Posttraumatic Symptom Severity and Shame.
The amount of variance explained by each model was compared to ascertain if adding 
shame adds a statistically significant contribution. Results partially supported the 
hypothesis. Shame caused a significant addition to the variance explaining inadequate 
self, hated self and self-criticism total, above the variance explained by depression and 
posttraumatic symptom severity. However shame did not cause a significant addition in 
the variance explaining self-reassurance, the self-improving and self-persecuting 
functions of self-criticism, above that explained by depression and symptom severity.
Exploratory Analyses
Further exploratory analyses were applied to look at the relationships between self­
reassurance and the different forms and functions of self-criticism (see Table 3). It was 
speculated that individuals who criticise themselves because they hate themselves might 
find it harder to reassure themselves compared to individuals who criticise themselves 
because they feel inadequate. There was a significant negative correlation between the 
hated self component and self-reassurance (rs= -0.52, p = 0.001), while the correlation 
between the inadequate self component and self-reassurance only reached significance at 
the p < 0.05 level (rs = -0.42, p = 0.02) and not the more stringent p < 0.01 level adopted. 
However there was not a significant difference between the sizes of the correlations
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LTable 4. Summary of Regression Analyses: Comparison of Variance Explained by Model l a versus Model 2 .
Dependent Variables R2 Model l a R2 Model 2b R2 Change F (1, 29) for R2 Change
FSCRS Inadequate Self 0.25 0.61 0.36 26.61**
Hated Self 0.54 0.65 0.11 9.09*
Self-Criticism Total 0.43 0.74 0.31 33.60**
Self-Reassurance 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.45
FSCS Self-Improving 0.21 0.27 0.06 2.83
Self-Persecuting 0.41 0.46 0.05 2.96
Note: * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001; PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale; ESS = Experience of Shame Scale; FSCRS = The Forms of Self- 
Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale; FSCS = The Functions of Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale.
a Model 1: Depression (BDI) and Posttraumatic Symptom Severity (PDS), predicting variables outlined in hypotheses. All R2 were statistically 
significant, except inadequate self and self-improving.
b Model 2: Depression (BDI), Posttraumatic Symptom Severity (PDS) and Shame (ESS Total), predicting variables outlined in hypotheses. All 
R2 were statistically significant, except self-improving.
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between hated self and self-reassurance and inadequate self and self-reassurance (z = 
0.53, p = 0.60).
It was also theorised that individuals who self-criticise to persecute themselves might 
find it harder to self-reassure than individuals who self-criticise to improve themselves. 
Although the negative correlation between self-persecuting and self-reassurance reached 
significance (rs = -0.45, p = 0.007) and the negative correlation between self-improving 
and self-reassurance did not (rs= -0.26, p = 0.14) the difference between the size of these 
correlations was not significant (z = 0.87, p = 0.38).
Discussion
This study explored the relationship between shame, self-criticism and self-reassurance 
in individuals suffering significant symptoms of PTSD. The hypotheses of this study 
were largely supported. Shame was shown to have a significant positive correlation with 
self-criticism and a significant negative correlation with self-reassurance. Both 
components of self-criticism (inadequate self and hated self) were positively correlated 
with shame. Interestingly, inadequate self had a numerically stronger correlation with 
shame than hated self, but this difference was not significant. The self-improving and 
self-persecuting functions of self-criticism also had significant positive correlations with 
shame and as predicted the self-persecuting function had a numerically larger 
correlation. However the difference between these correlations was also not significant. 
Shame added a significant addition to the variance explaining self-criticism (inadequate 
self, hated self and self-criticism total) above that explained by depression and symptom 
severity, but did not add a significant addition to the variance explaining self­
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reassurance, the self-improving and self-persecuting functions of self-criticism, above 
that explained by depression and symptom severity. Exploratory analyses revealed that 
the hated self component of self-criticism had a numerically stronger negative 
correlation with self-reassurance than the inadequate self component, but this difference 
did not reach significance. Similarly the self-persecuting function of self-criticism had a 
numerically stronger negative correlation with self-reassurance than the self-improving 
function of self-criticism but again this difference was not significant.
The sample in this current study had higher scores on depression and self-criticism 
compared to a non-clinical sample. Scores on shame were also significantly higher than 
the non-clinical population, except for the bodily shame sub-component, where no 
significant difference was found. This is not necessarily unexpected given that the non- 
clinical sample was an undergraduate student population, 82% of whom were female. 
The non-clinical sample had higher scores on self-reassurance and did not differ 
significantly from the current sample on the self-improving or self-persecuting functions 
of self-criticism. Again one would expect a non-clinical sample to score higher on self­
reassurance, and it also might seem intuitive that a high-achieving student population 
would be prone to criticise themselves with the aim of self-improvement. It was 
surprising however that a difference was not found between the scores on the self- 
persecuting function of self-criticism, although the difference did approach significance 
with the clinical sample tending to have higher scores.
The findings from this current study add further support to research that has shown that 
some individuals with PTSD experience high levels of shame (Andrews et al., 2000;
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Brewin et al., 2000; Grey et al., 2001; Holmes et al., 2005; Lee et al., in preparation) and 
that shame might play an important role in creating/maintaining the sense of ongoing 
current threat associated with PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This current study found 
that shame had a positive association with self-criticism and a negative association with 
self-reassurance which corresponds with Gilbert et al.’s (in press) research, which found 
a similar relationship between self-criticism, self-reassurance and depression. However 
in this current study shame was not shown to add a significant contribution to the 
variance explaining self-reassurance, but did add a significant contribution to the 
variance explaining self-criticism, above that explained by depression and symptom 
severity. It seems likely therefore that self-reassurance is inversely related to general 
levels of negativity with the self or general levels of distress rather than shame 
specifically, whereas self-criticism seems to have a more direct relationship with shame.
Gilbert et al. (2004) used path analysis to look at the relationships between the different 
forms and functions of self-criticism and depression. They concluded that the self- 
persecuting function of self-criticism was particularly pathogenic and was positively 
mediated by the hated self dimension of self-criticism. Unfortunately the sample size in 
this current study was insufficient to use path analysis to investigate how the forms and 
functions of self-criticism interacted. However comparison between the strength of 
correlations in this current study failed to show that the hated self component of self- 
criticism had a stronger correlation with shame than the inadequate self component or 
that the self-persecuting function of self-criticism had a stronger correlation with shame 
than the self-improving function. It may be the sample size in this study was too small to
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detect a possibly subtle effect or that the analyses used were too simplistic given the 
potential interactions between the variables.
However there may be other reasons why this study failed to show a difference between 
the different forms and functions of self-criticism. Gilbert et al. (2004) investigated self- 
criticism and self-reassurance in relation to depression. However in this study these 
concepts were investigated in relation to shame. Shame by definition is about feeling 
inferior and worthless, and therefore the inadequate self component of self-criticism 
might actually be just as important to shame, if not more so, than the hated self­
component. Gilbert et al. (2004) also used a non-clinical sample to investigate these 
concepts, whereas this current study used a clinical sample. It may be that in a clinical 
sample all forms and functions of self-criticism are equally damaging, whether they are 
related to feelings of inadequacy or hatred or whether they are intended to improve the 
self or persecute the self. Indeed it could be argued that it is not the form self-criticism 
takes or the reason self-criticism is given that is important but how self-criticism is 
delivered. Gilbert (2000) emphasises that the impact of self-criticism is not just related 
to the words used or the beliefs involved but is also associated with affective qualities 
associated with the criticism (e.g., the tone of the criticism, the power with which 
criticism is delivered and images and memories that might accompany the criticism). It 
may be that clinical samples are prone to deliver any self-criticism with particular power 
and hostile tone, so that all self-criticism has an equally negative impact.
One finding of interest in this current study was that shame added a significant addition 
to the variance explaining self-criticism (inadequate self, hated self and self-criticism
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total) above that explained by depression and symptom severity but failed to add a 
significant addition to the variance which explained the different functions of self- 
criticism (self-improving and self-persecuting) above that explained by depression and 
symptom severity. This suggests that individuals experiencing high levels of shame 
might be criticising themselves for some other function which is not being measured by 
the Functions of Self-Criticising and Attacking Scale (FSCS; Gilbert et al. 2004). Indeed 
it is likely that there are many different reasons why people criticise themselves and it 
may be that the distinction between criticising to improve oneself and criticising to 
persecute oneself is too narrow and under-inclusive. For example, some people might 
criticise themselves as a protective function, to stop them acting in a way that might 
prove detrimental (e.g., ‘you are so disgusting’ [and therefore you must never reveal 
these qualities to anyone in case they reject you]). The FSCS was influenced by 
Gilbert’s clinical work with depressed patients and thus it may be that this measure is 
better at tapping into the functions of self-criticism linked to depression rather than those 
linked to shame. Alternatively it may be that the reasons people criticise themselves are 
so diverse and idiosyncratic that there is not any specific function which is specific to 
shame.
Clearly any conclusions drawn from this current study are tentative given the number of 
limitations, such as low sample size, use of multiple regression when variables were not 
normally distributed and the use of a cross-sectional design. For example, it is not 
possible to ascertain if self-criticism is a risk factor for PTSD, because we do not know 
if self-criticism causes shame (and subsequent current threat) or simply whether 
individuals with PTSD who feel shame then become more self-critical. Future research
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would benefit from exploring these concepts using a prospective design, in which self- 
criticism and self-reassurance are explored post-trauma but prior to the development of 
PTSD. That said, the results of this study suggest a number of implications for the 
treatment of individuals with PTSD experiencing high levels of shame. Firstly it seems 
important that clinicians view the reduction of shame as a key factor in the treatment of 
PTSD, as it seems likely that shame contributes to the generation of ongoing current 
threat at the heart of PTSD. This study has shown that individuals experiencing high 
levels of shame are prone to engage in self-critical thinking and that when shame is 
accompanied by high levels of depression and symptoms are severe these individuals are 
also unable to reassure themselves and make themselves feel safe again. Cognitive 
techniques that teach patients how to challenge and change negative thoughts/beliefs 
have been used alongside traditional exposure based therapy for many years (e.g., Grey, 
Young & Holmes, 2002). However this research suggests that patients might also need 
to be taught techniques that help them develop inner caring, compassion and self­
reassurance and that these techniques might prove an important adjunct to conventional 
methods of treatment for PTSD.
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Critical Appraisal
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Introduction
This study was interested in the role that shame might play in the development and 
maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As postulated in the cognitive 
model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) PTSD develops when the trauma/trauma 
sequelae is interpreted in way that causes an individual to experience an ongoing sense 
of current threat. Although threat is normally thought about in relation to fear, following 
from the ideas of Ehlers and Clark (2000), this study suggested that shame might also 
contribute to the creation/maintenance of ongoing current threat through attack on an 
individual’s positive sense of self and psychological integrity. It was therefore 
considered important to investigate the factors that might be contributing to a shame 
response in individuals with PTSD, so that these might be targeted in treatment 
interventions for this client group. The results of this study highlighted that individuals 
with PTSD associated with higher levels of shame had higher levels of self-criticism 
than individuals with lower levels of shame. It is therefore suggested that self-criticism 
may be creating/maintaining a shame response, which in turn contributes to ongoing 
current threat. It was also shown that the more severe individuals’ symptoms of PTSD 
and the more symptoms of depression they had, the more likely they were to also lack 
the ability to self-reassure and make themselves feel safe again, making it harder for 
them to combat manifest current threat.
The first section of this critical review will offer reflections on the research process, 
discussing potential limitations of this study and presenting ideas for future research. 
The second section will focus on the clinical implications this study generates.
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Reflection on the Research Process 
Limitations
One of the potential problems of this study was that The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic 
Scale (PDS: Foa, 1995) was chosen to measure symptoms of PTSD. The PDS is a self- 
report instrument based on the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD and can be used to establish a diagnosis of PTSD and a 
symptom severity score. At the outset, it was decided that participants who did not meet 
full diagnostic criteria for PTSD based on the PDS, would be excluded from the study, 
and thus the PDS acted as a screening device as well as a measure of symptom severity. 
However a number of problems with this strategy arose once the research process was 
underway. Firstly the PDS relies on participants answering the questionnaire in full in 
order for a diagnosis of PTSD to be established. In this current study participants were 
required to fill out questionnaires on their own at home and then either return them by 
post or give them to their assessing clinician at their next appointment. Unfortunately 
this meant that some participants did not answer all of the questions, which meant that 
the PDS could not be used to make a diagnosis. In retrospect it should have been 
anticipated that this method of data collection was not the most appropriate for a 
screening device which relied on a questionnaire being answered in full. In addition the 
PDS is a fairly long questionnaire (49 items) and deals with a very sensitive subject 
matter (trauma) which makes it even more likely that some participants would leave 
some questions unanswered. These problems were resolved by adopting a second 
screening method which will be discussed further in the sections below.
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Another problem that arose when using the PDS in this current study is that although the 
PDS is based on the DSM-IV (now DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) criteria for PTSD, it does not map the criteria exactly. For example, Criterion A of 
the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR stipulates that an individual must have ‘experienced, 
witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others’. While the 
PDS addresses physical injury to self or others and concerns about one’s own or other’s 
life being in danger, it fails to ask questions about physical integrity. Threat to physical 
integrity is likely to be a key factor for some individuals with PTSD, who were not 
necessarily injured or had concerns that their life was in danger (such as some cases of 
rape or childhood sexual abuse). Thus the PDS might classify some individuals as not 
having PTSD when in fact they do meet diagnostic criteria judged by the DSM- 
IV/DSM-IV-TR.
Another problem concerns the general use of the DSM-IV/ DSM-IV-TR criteria for 
PTSD and the problems of using and relying on diagnostic categorisation. Some 
clinicians argue that an over reliance on diagnostic categorisation can be unhelpful and 
emphasise that a diagnostic label is simply a group of symptoms that have been 
observed to cluster together with statistical significance, rather than representing a real 
entity that actually exists and that diagnoses are often unreliable. This view places 
individual formulation at the heart of treatment and discourages pre-occupation with 
labels and categories. However others argue that diagnostic categories can be useful as 
they can help researchers identify specific risk factors for specific illnesses, help with 
the identification of suitable treatments, can help an individual feel understood and can
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aid understanding and communication for health professionals (see Bentall, 2003, for a 
review of this debate).
Other researchers have criticised specific criteria within certain diagnostic categories, 
arguing that they are under-inclusive. For example, Brewin, Andrews and Rose (2000) 
have criticised the subjective criteria of the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR diagnosis for PTSD, 
which specifies that individuals must have experienced fear, helplessness or horror 
during the traumatic event. They highlight that some individuals might have memory 
loss for the trauma, such as those having suffered drug rape or head injury, which makes 
it difficult or impossible to attribute specific emotional reactions. Indeed one of the 
participants in this current study had suffered drug rape and could not judge her 
emotional reactions during the trauma, but met all the other diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 
Brewin et al. (2000) also suggest that emotions other than fear, helplessness or horror 
might play an important role in PTSD, including secondary emotions which are based on 
cognitive appraisals following the trauma. They found a sub-group of individuals who 
did not appear to experience intense emotions at the time of the trauma despite 
experiencing the other persistent features of PTSD. These individuals did however 
report strong emotions of either anger or shame (hypothesised secondary emotions) and 
these emotions had independent effects on later PTSD. The authors suggest that these 
results indicate that the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD may have to be amended to 
include emotions other than just fear, helplessness and horror, and that it may be 
beneficial to include secondary emotional reactions as well as primary ones.
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Another problem with the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD is that it places 
‘actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or 
others’ as a central component in PTSD but fails to acknowledge the role that threat to 
psychological integrity may play. The cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) 
suggests that PTSD is caused by a sense of ongoing current threat and following from 
these ideas this study has suggested that shame can contribute to ongoing threat by 
attacking an individual’s positive sense of self and psychological integrity. It can thus be 
proposed that some individuals will develop PTSD not because they have experienced 
‘actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or 
others’ but rather because they are experiencing high levels of shame and feel that their 
psychological integrity has been threatened. However at present the current diagnostic 
criteria fails to acknowledge the potential role that threat to psychological integrity may 
play in PTSD.
Whilst this current study originally planned to use a diagnosis o f PTSD as inclusion 
criteria for participation in the research, this was subsequently changed so that 
participants had to be experiencing significant posttraumatic symptoms to be included in 
this research. This was partly because low recruitment rates made it difficult to maintain 
such a strict inclusion criteria, but this decision was also made because of some of the 
problems with the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR criteria outlined above. This decision led to a 
change in the way participants were screened. Instead of relying solely on the PDS, 
clinicians’ advice was sought on whether they considered their clients to either have met 
full diagnostic criteria for PTSD or whether they judged them to experiencing significant 
posttraumatic symptoms. This also solved the problem of what to do about missing data
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from the PDS, as participants were now being screened by two methods; the PDS and/or 
clinical judgement.
As mentioned above this research did suffer from low recruitment rates. Although the 
aim was to recruit 50 participants, only 37 were actually recruited. Recruitment was 
particularly low in the first eight months of data collection and based on the recruitment 
rate at that point in time it did not seem likely that more than 25 participants would be 
recruited in total. In order to tackle this problem a number of steps were taken. Firstly a 
number of additional clinics offering treatment for PTSD were approached. This 
increased the research from a two site study to a five site study, thus increasing the 
amount of people invited to take part in the research. A number of amendments were 
also made to the initial protocol (for which ethical approval was gained). This included 
offering participants £6 for filling out and returning completed questionnaires and 
phoning potential participants about the research. Potential participants were only 
phoned if they had already been assessed and the assessing clinician thought this was 
appropriate. The aim of phoning participants was to check they had received an optional 
research pack, to remind them about the research, to ask them if they would like to take 
part in the research and to give them an opportunity to ask any questions they may have. 
It was also made very clear that participation in the research was voluntary and that a 
reason did not have to be given for not volunteering. Luckily the amendments to the 
protocol along with increasing the number of research sites led to an improvement in 
recruitment. With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been advantageous to have 
implemented these strategies at the start of the research process.
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Another potential problem was that there was a time lag between the dates some of the 
different questionnaires were completed. This was because some clinics already had a 
set assessment procedure, which involved patients filling out a range of questionnaires 
including the PDS and BDI. Rather than disrupting this procedure it was decided that 
this research would use this questionnaire data, as in reality it was unlikely that there 
would be a long lag between patients filling out these questionnaire and those used in 
this current study. While this was the case for most participants, for some participants 
there was a longer time lag than expected. For three participants there was a lag of over 
nine months, which arose as these participants had been recruited from a treatment 
waiting list and had filled out the PDS and BDI when they were assessed over nine 
months earlier. In retrospect it would have been beneficial to have sent people who had 
been on the treatment waiting list for a long time another PDS and BDI to fill out 
alongside the questionnaires in this current study but unfortunately this was not done at 
the time. The PDS and BDI data for these three participants were removed from the 
analysis to prevent any potential confounding factors. It was still possible to ascertain 
however if these participants were still suffering significant posttraumatic symptoms 
because all three were subsequently taken on for treatment and thus the treating 
clinicians could be consulted. Having removed the PDS and BDI data for these three 
participants the longest time lag between measures was approximately three months. 
Although this was not ideal, it was tolerated. If the study were repeated it would be 
advantageous to try and send all questionnaires out at one time point. This would 
involve greater negotiation with the clinics used to recruit participants and the likelihood 
that some participants would be asked to fill out the PDS and BDI twice, albeit at 
different points in time.
Ideas for Future Research
Throughout this research process a number of ideas for future research have been 
generated. Firstly when the results of this study were analysed it was found that most of 
the variables were not normally distributed and therefore non-parametric correlations 
were implemented. However inspection of the histograms revealed interesting frequency 
distributions for some variables. Specifically the self-criticism total score and the shame 
total score raised the possibility of a bi-modal distribution with two distinct groups; low 
self-criticism versus high self-criticism and low shame versus high shame respectively. 
Interestingly Andrews, Brewin, Rose and Kirk (2000) reported dichotomising their 
shame scale into little or no shame versus high shame due to the distribution of their 
results. In this current study a median split analysis was considered but a decision was 
made to analyse the data using non-parametric correlations instead, as the bi-modal 
distribution was not as distinct as one would have ideally hoped for. However future 
research might benefit from investigating further the possibility of there being 
individuals with PTSD experiencing very little or no shame versus individuals with 
PTSD experiencing very high shame, and to explore in more depth what distinguishes 
between these two groups.
Another suggestion for future research stems from the finding that in this current study 
shame added a significant addition to the variance explaining self-criticism (inadequate 
self, hated self and self-criticism total) above that explained by depression and symptom 
severity but failed to add a significant addition to the variance which explained the 
different functions of self-criticism (self-improving and self-persecuting) above that 
explained by depression and symptom severity. This suggests that individuals with
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PTSD experiencing high levels of shame may be criticising themselves for reasons not 
measured using the Functions of Self-Criticising and Attacking Scale (FSCS; Gilbert, 
Clarke, Hempel, Miles & Irons, 2004). Indeed the FSCS was influenced by Gilbert’s 
clinical work with depressed patients and thus it may be that this measure is better at 
tapping into the functions of self-criticism linked to depression rather than those linked 
to shame. Future research might benefit from exploring these ideas further, using a 
qualitative design in which individuals with PTSD experiencing high levels of shame are 
interviewed and asked questions about the reasons they criticise themselves. It may be 
for example, that this particular client group have very specific reasons for criticising 
themselves which relate to the traumatic events they have experienced. Or it may be that 
individuals experiencing shame criticise themselves as a way of stopping themselves 
revealing or repeating the things they have done that they considered shameful (e.g.,
‘you are so disgusting’ [and therefore you must never reveal these qualities to anyone in 
case they reject you]). Although this might seem to fit into the ‘self-improving’ function, 
there is a subtle difference in that the reason is much more about stopping someone 
seeing the self as bad rather than trying to improve the self or make others see the self as 
good. This would fit with the evolutionary view of shame which suggests that shame 
evolved as a protective function, to stop the self acting in a way that might provoke 
attack from dominant others. However research might alternatively show that the 
reasons people criticise themselves are so diverse and idiosyncratic that there is not any 
specific function which is specific to shame.
Another idea for future research would involve measuring the same concepts as those 
measured in this current study but following a prospective design. One of the problems
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with this current study is that the direction of causation cannot be established. For 
example, we do not know if self-criticism causes shame (and subsequent current threat 
leading to PTSD) or simply whether individuals with PTSD who feel shame then 
become more self-critical. If self-criticism (and self-reassurance) were measured 
immediately post-trauma, and then individuals were followed up to see which 
individuals developed PTSD associated with high levels of shame, it would be possible 
to ascertain more clearly whether self-criticism was in fact a risk factor for the 
development of PTSD associated with high levels of shame.
Clinical Implications of the Research
Traditional methods of treatment for PTSD have focused on techniques that aim to 
reduce fear (e.g., exposure), as fear is seen as one of the primary emotions experienced 
at the time of the trauma and is also likely to be re-experienced again alongside trauma 
related intrusions. A great deal of research has shown that the use of prolonged imaginal 
exposure to memories of the traumatic event is an effective treatment intervention for 
PTSD (e.g., Foa & Meadows, 1997). However recent research, including this current 
study, has shown that a range of other emotions also seem to play an important role in 
the development and maintenance of PTSD and this has fuelled the development of 
alternative and complementary approaches to traditional exposure based-treatment 
(Grey, Young & Holmes, 2002; Lee, Scragg & Turner, 2001; Tarrier, Sommerfield, 
Pilgrim, & Humphreys, 1999). Indeed recent research advocates treatment methods that 
include both an element of prolonged exposure and cognitive therapy in the treatment of 
PTSD. For example, Grey et al. (2002) discuss the importance of cognitive restructuring 
both prior to and during exposure/reliving and suggest that this might be particularly
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relevant for individuals suffering shame, guilt, or anger, which unlike cognitions related 
to fear, are unlikely to spontaneously restructure through traditional exposure methods.
It is likely to prove beneficial however, if research continues to explore in more depth 
the different factors related to specific emotions in PTSD, so that treatment interventions 
can continue to evolve and progress for this client group.
This study explored the factors that might be associated with shame within a PTSD 
sample and found that self-criticism seems to be a key factor in creating/maintaining a 
shame response. In addition when shame is accompanied by severe symptoms of PTSD 
and depressive symptoms, individuals are also more likely to have problems reassuring 
themselves, making it harder for them to combat their self-critical thoughts and thus 
contributing to the maintenance of shame. These results have important implications for 
treatment; they suggest that individuals with PTSD experiencing high levels of shame 
need to be taught techniques that help tackle self-critical thoughts and that an important 
component of this may involve helping patients learn to reassure themselves and make 
themselves feel safe again. This would hopefully reduce the shame response, contribute 
to a reduction in ongoing current threat and therefore contribute to a reduction in PTSD 
symptoms. Although many treatment approaches for trauma already advocate cognitive- 
behavioural techniques that help individuals challenge negative thoughts, the idea of 
using techniques that help individuals activate inner caring, compassion and the ability 
to self-reassure is a new and promising area.
One way of helping individuals activate inner caring and compassion involves using an 
adaptation of the two-chair technique (Greenberg, Elliott & Foerster, 1990; Greenberg,
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Rice & Elliott, 1993), but this time adding a third chair (see Gilbert, 2000). Having role- 
played their self-critical attacks and then their response to these attacks, clinicians can 
then ask individuals to role-play a more caring and compassionate self in the third chair. 
This caring and compassionate self can speak to the defeated and attacked part of the 
self offering warmth, understanding and reassurance. However it can also speak to the 
attacking part of self too. For example the caring and compassionate part of the self 
might ask the attacking part of the self questions about when it first started criticising 
‘patient X’ or what it feels it is gaining from criticising ‘patient X’. Just as bullies in the 
external world have complex and diverse reasons for their actions an individual’s 
‘internal bully’ (Gilbert, 2000) can also have different reasons why it is critical. For 
example, Gilbert (2000) cites the example of a patient who realised that ‘the bullying 
part of me is really quite frightened and thinks if I don’t make the grade no one will care 
or love it’ (p. 139). Thus learning to be compassionate to the self-critical part of the self 
can in some cases be just as important as learning to care for and be compassionate to 
the attacked and defeated part of the self. It is also important to note that learning to be 
compassionate towards the self is not always about changing a part of the self but it is 
also about learning to accept yourself and understand yourself which might mean 
learning to tolerate uncomfortable feelings rather than trying to get rid of them.
Another way of enhancing an individual’s ability to be caring and compassionate 
towards the self is through the use of imagery. Gilbert (2000) highlights that individuals 
can often generate powerful images that accompany their self-critical thoughts and that 
the strength of an internal attack is thus not simply dependant on the words used or the 
beliefs involved but is also associated with affective qualities associated with the
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criticism (e.g., what they look like, tone of voice). Indeed this current study failed to 
show that the different forms or functions of self-criticism had differential impacts on 
the experience of shame, suggesting that it may be the way individuals with high levels 
of shame criticise themselves that is paramount. These ideas can be applied to the caring 
and compassionate inner voice too. Gilbert (2000) suggests that generating an image to 
accompany an individual’s inner caring and compassionate can help enhance the degree 
to which an individual responds in a cared for and understood way. This is equally true 
for the tone taken by a caring and compassionate inner voice. Gilbert (2000) emphasises 
that the messages given by a caring compassionate part of the self may be similar to 
those elicited using standard cognitive therapy. However he highlights that it is the way 
these messages are delivered that is the key to their success. It is easy to imagine that if 
clinicians are not careful individuals will recruit the self-critical part of the self to deliver 
the messages of cognitive therapy. Indeed Gilbert et al. (2004) cite a clinical example of 
a patient who turned the exercise of challenging her negative thoughts into another 
chance to criticise herself, (e.g., ‘You must learn to focus on your positives and not think 
in black and white’, p 47). Gilbert (2000) suggests that it is worth while getting patients 
to practise delivering messages to the self in therapy to ensure that they are delivering 
them in a caring and compassionate way.
Lee (in press) similarly advocates the use of an image to accompany an individual’s 
inner caring and compassion. She highlights that traditional cognitive techniques can 
sometimes result in a discrepancy between what someone knows cognitively and what 
they feel emotionally and that without a congruent emotional shift, cognitive techniques 
are unlikely to prove beneficial in the long term. Lee (in press) suggests that one way of
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tackling this discrepancy is by helping clients create an image of a ‘perfect nurturer’ 
who is caring, compassionate and meets their needs perfectly. Individuals are 
encouraged to create an image which they will find most helpful, as the perfect nurturer 
is not a prescriptive image. The perfect nurturer is designed to activate self-soothing 
emotions and once practised can be used to re-frame negative cognitions. Lee (in press) 
cites a case example of a women suffering PTSD associated with high levels of shame 
and depression, for whom traditional cognitive therapy techniques had failed to produce 
an emotional shift. The results of this study suggest that this woman would be 
particularly likely to have problems with self-reassurance, suggesting the need for 
techniques that promote inner caring and compassion. Indeed when Lee (in press) used 
the same cognitive techniques in conjunction with the compassionate technique of the 
‘perfect nurturer’ a significant emotional shift was achieved (reduction in depression 
score) and improvements in functioning were gained (return to work). Lee (in press) 
suggests that the creation of an image to accompany self-compassion and inner warmth 
not only helps bring about emotional change but can also help create a retrieval bias for 
this way of inner relating, because the memories laid down are particularly distinctive.
Gilbert (2000) however notes that clinicians must be aware of some of the potential 
problems of using techniques to activate a caring and compassionate side of the self. 
Firstly he suggests that for some individuals caring and warmth can actually act as a 
threatening signal. For example, some individuals who have been abused will associate 
apparent warmth and caring with their abuser who might have used signals of warmth to 
instigate abuse. Secondly he suggests that for some individuals accessing a caring part of 
the self may actually activate a grieving process or increase a sense of aloneness as it
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makes an individual aware of the care they might have missed out on in their past or 
leaves them feeling that they have an empty void inside them where their caring and 
compassionate self should be. Finally he suggests that clinicians need to be aware that 
individuals may have beliefs that cause resistance in accessing a caring and 
compassionate part of the self and that these may need to be dealt with before further 
work in this area can progress. For example, individuals may have beliefs that recruiting 
a caring, nurturing part of the self is weak and a sign of giving in, which would thus 
counteract any work done on trying to activate this part of the self.
Conclusion
This current research project has been an interesting and rewarding process and has 
proved to be an important learning experience about the nature of research. It has 
demonstrated that researchers need to be flexible and adaptive throughout each stage of 
the research process, responding to things that don’t go as planned and being prepared to 
make amendments when necessary. It has shown how ideas for future research can be 
generated and how research can offer important implications for treatment interventions. 
In sum it is hoped that this research project will contribute to the field of clinical 
psychology and offer important insights into the role shame, self-critical thinking and 
self-reassuring thinking may play in the development and maintenance of current threat 
in posttraumatic stress disorder.
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m
Camden & Isiingtcn Community Health Services Local Research Ethics Committee
LREC Ref: 03/108
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Ms R Harman 
27 February 2004
Dear Ms Harman
Title: An investigation into sham e and  self-critical thinking versus self-reassuring  thinking in 
Posctraum atic S tress Disorder.
Thank you for submitting the above project for ethical consideration. The Committee gave careful consideration to 
your proposal at its meeting on 23rd February 2004. I am pleased to inform you that the Local Research Ethics 
Committee has no ethical objections to your project proceeding. This opinion has also been communicated to the 
North Central London Community Research Consortium.
PI FA SF MOTF THAT THIS OPINION ALONE DOES NOT ENTITLE YOU TO BEGIN RESEARCHr YOU Ml 1ST 
RECEIVE AN APPROVAL FROM EACH NHS_TRLIST_HQ.STING YQUR RESEARCH.
Camden and Islington Community Health Service LREC considers the ethics of proposed research projects and 
provides advice to NHS bodies under the auspices of which the research is intended to take place. It is that NHS 
body which has the responsibility to decide whether or not the project should go ahead, taking into account the 
ethical advice of the LREC1. W here these procedures take place on NHS premises or using NHS patients, the 
researcher must obtain the agreem ent of local NHS management, who will need to be assured that the researcher 
holds an appropriate NHS contract, and that indemnity issues have been adequately addressed.
N.B. Camden and Islington Community Health Service LREC is an independent body providing advice to the North 
Central London Community Research Consortium. A favourable opinion from the LREC and approval from the 
Trust to commence research on Trust premises or patients are NOT one and the same. Trust approval is notified 
through the Research & Development Unit (please see attached flow chart).
T he fo llo w in g  c o n d itio n s  apply to  th is  project:
• It should be made clear to patients, which questionnaires are for research and which are part of tne clinics 
usual process.
• The title on patient literature should be changed to ‘Positive and Negative Thinking’.
• You must write and inform the Committee of the start date of your project. The Committee (via the Local 
Research Ethics Committee Administrator or the Chair at the above address) must also receive notification:
a) when the study commences;
b) when the study is complete;
1 Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees, July 2001 (known as GAFREC)
An advisory com m ittee to  North Central London Strategic Health Authority
c) if it fails to start or is abandoned;
d) if the investigator/s change and
e) if any amendments to the study are made.
♦ The Committee must receive immediate notification of any adverse or unforeseen circumstances arising out of
♦ It is the responsibility of the investigators to ensure that all associated staff, including nursing staff, are 
informed of research projects and are told that they have the approval of the Ethics Committee and 
management approval from the body hosting the research.
♦ The Committee will require a copy of the report on completion of the project and may request details of the 
progress of the research project periodically (i.e. annually for longer projects).
♦ If data is to be stored on a computer in such a way as to make it possible to identify individuals, then the project
must be registered under the Data Protection Act 1998. Please consult your department data protection officer
♦ Failure to adhere to these conditions set out above will result in the invalidation of this letter of no objection.
Please forward any additional information/amendments regarding your study to the Local Research Ethics 
Committee Administrator or the Chair at the above address.
Yours sincerely
the project.
for advice.
LREC Chair
Email:  (LREC Administrator)
Enc/s:
Copy to:
An advisory com m ittee to  North Central London Strategic Health Authority
Oxfordshire REC C f 'W j  JfT'JJ 
r i V i r ^ l
29 June 2004
Ms Rachel M Harman
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Camden and Islington Mental Health and
Dear Ms Harman,
Full title of study: Shame, self-critical thinking and self-reassuring thinking in 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
REC reference number: 04/Q1606/23 
Protocol number: None
Thank you for your letter of 11 June 2004, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research.
The further information was considered at the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the REC 
held on 18 June 2004 A list of the members who were present at the meeting is attached.
Confirmation of ethical opinion
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation.
The favourable opinion applies to the following research site:
Site: Oxfordshire Mental Health Care NHS Trust
Principal Investigator: Ms Rachel M Harman
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the 
attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows:
Document Type: Application 
Version: Parts A, B and C 
Dated: 03/05/2004 
Date Received: 30/04/2004
Document Type: Investigator CV 
Version: Rachel Harman
An advisory com m ittee to  Thames Valley Strategic Health Authority
Dated: 23/04/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Investigator CV 
Version: Deborah Lee 
Dated: 04/05/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Protocol 
Version: None 
Dated: 06/02/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Covering Letter 
Version: None 
Dated: 26/04/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Peer Review
Version: UCL Doctorate in Clinical Psychology - Proposal Review Form
Dated: 09/12/2003
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire 
Version: FSCRS 
Dated: 04/05/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire
Version: FSCS
Dated: 04/05/2004
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire 
Version: Experience of Shame Scale 
Dated: 04/05/2004 
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Document Type: Letters of Invitation to Participants
Version: 2
Dated: 11/06/2004
Date Received: 15/06/2004
Document Type: Participant Information Sheet
Version: 2
Dated: 11/06/2004
Date Received: 15/06/2004
Document Type: Participant Consent Form
Version: 2
Dated: 11/06/2004
Date Received: 15/06/2004
Document Type: Response to Request for Further Information 
Version:
Dated: 11/06/2004 
Date Received: 15/06/2004
An advisory com m ittee to  Thames Valley Strategic Health A uthority
Document Type: Other
Version: Data Protection Registration
Dated: 14/04/2004
Date Received: 04/05/2004
Management approval -
The study may not commence until final management approval-has been confirmed by the 
organisation hosting the research.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research must 
obtain management approval from the relevant host organisation before commencing any 
research procedures. Where a substantive contract is not held with the host organisation, it 
may be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before approval for the research can 
be given.
Notification of other bodies
We shall notify the research sponsor, Oxfordshire Mental Health Care NHS Trust that the 
study has a favourable ethical opinion.
Statement of compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
REC reference number: 04/Q1606/23 Please quote this number on all correspondence
Yours sincerely,
Chairman
Enclosures List of names and professions of members who were present at the meeting 
Standard approval conditions
An advisory com m ittee to  Thames Valley Strategic Health Authority
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Patient Invitation Letter, Patient Information Sheet and Consent Form
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Camden and Islington
Mental Health and Social Care Trust
Dear Patient,
This envelope contains two research studies th a t are being conducted a t the 
Traumatic S tre ss  Clinic. I t  is hoped th a t th e  results of these studies will help 
us to  understand people's reactions to trauma b e tte r. B etter understanding 
should allow us to develop more advanced treatm ents in the  future.
We would be very grateful if you could take the  time to complete these two 
studies. Completing both studies should only take 25-30 minutes. You would 
simply need to read th e  information sheet, sign th e  consent form, and complete 
the  questionnaires. You could then post the  questionnaires and consent form 
back in the  stamped addressed envelope (included) or bring them to your f irs t 
appointment a t the Traumatic S tress  Clinic and give them to your clinician. Full 
instructions can be found in the  information sheets.
* I f  you decide to take part we will send you a payment of £ 6 .0 0  in the 
post when we have received your completed pack *
You do not have to take part in these studies. Your decision whether to take 
part of not will not a ffe c t your care and management in any way. Some of the 
questionnaires could cause some distress. I f  you do feel distressed please 
contact  (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) on  
and she will be happy to talk through these issues with you.
Thank you very much fo r your help!
Sarah and Rachel
I f  you do not wish to take part in this research, please fill this slip in and bring 
to your clinician a t th e  clinic or post it back to us in the stamped addressed 
envelope.
I  do not wish to take part in this research
Signed: Print Name:
Camden and Islington
M ental H ealth  an d  Social Care Trust 
INFORMATION SHEET
Dear Patient,
Studies: “ Unwanted Thoughts and Images” and “Shame, Negative Thinking and 
Positive Thinking in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder”
Researchers: Dr Sarah Marzillier and Rachel Harman (Trainee Clinical 
Psychologists)
Supervisors: Dr Craig Steel and Dr Peter Scragg; Dr Deborah Lee.
Hospital: The Traumatic Stress Clinic, 73 Charlotte Street, London W1T 4PL.
You are being invited to take part in two research studies. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. We are two Trainee Clinical Psychologists conducting studies as part of our 
training. Both studies have been combined into one questionnaire pack. One study 
is investigating whether some elements of a person’s personality and beliefs can 
affect the intrusions (i.e. unwanted thoughts and images) that they experience after 
trauma. If we can understand why some people might experience more intrusions 
than others, then we might be able to understand why some people have a more 
disturbing reaction to trauma than others. The other study is investigating the 
feeling of shame in relation to PTSD and particularly how negative thinking and 
positive thinking may be related to this. It is hoped that the information gained from 
these studies may help us to treat future patients with PTSD better.
What will I have to do?
If you decide to take part in these studies, you will be asked to fill out some 
questionnaires. Some of these will be part of the standard assessment procedure at 
the Traumatic Stress Clinic, while others will be specific to this research. Filling out 
the questionnaires will take approximately 25-30 minutes. To take part in both 
studies (which have been combined into one questionnaire pack) you would simply 
need to:
1. Read this information sheet.
2. Read and sign the consent form.
3. Complete the 6 questionnaires included in this envelope. These may be in a 
random order and are called:
■ Trauma Intrusion Questionnaire
■ Beliefs and Experiences Scale
■ Dissociation Questionnaire
■ FSCS Scale
■ SASR
■ ESS
4. Put the completed consent form and questionnaires into the envelope 
provided. You can then put them in the post (postage has been prepaid) or 
bring them to your assessment appointment and give the envelope to your 
clinician along with the other questionnaires you have been asked to 
complete. All information that you give will remain confidential at all times.
Some details (e.g. date of trauma, gender, age, ethnicity) will also be collected from 
your files at the Clinic. We may also put the questionnaires that you complete back 
into your file at the clinic for your clinician to see (in order for them to have more
information about you that may be helpful for you). Please let us know on the 
consent form if you do not wish us to do this.
Will 1 be paid for my time?
If you decide to take part, you will be paid £6.00 for your time. A postal order will 
sent to vour address when we have received the completed questionnaire pack.
Will you contact me?
If we have not already received your completed questionnaire pack, we may 
telephone you within a few weeks of you receiving this optional research pack. This 
is to make sure that you have received the pack, to find out whether or not you wish 
to take part in the research, and to offer you assistance in completing the pack (if 
you wish to do so). Please feel free to let us know that you do not wish to take part 
in the research when we call you. The decision is entirely yours and we will not 
pressure you in any way to take part in these studies. If you do not wish us to 
telephone you, please let us know by completing the “opt-out” form on the 
bottom of the cover letter that you received with this pack and posting it back 
to us in the envelope provided.
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you decide 
to take part you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
Your decision whether to take part of not will not affect your care and 
management in any way. Please be warned that some of the questionnaires 
relate to what may be upsetting and sensitive experiences.
All proposals for research using human subjects are reviewed by an ethics 
committee before they can proceed. This proposal was reviewed by Camden and 
Islington Community Health Services Local Research Ethics Committee. If you 
have any questions or concerns about the study, please feel free to contact us. You 
can contact us at:
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology 
University College London, Gower Street 
London WC1E6BT
Thank you very much for your time and assistance with this study.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Sarah Marzillier 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Rachel Harman
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Camden and Islington
Mental Health and Social Care Trust
CONSENT FORM
Study: "Unwanted Thoughts and Images" and "Shame, Negative Thinking and 
Positive Thinking in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder"
Researchers: Dr Sarah Marzillier and Rachel Harman
Hospital: The Traumatic Stress Clinic, 73 Charlotte Street, London WIT 4PL.
To be completed by the patient. Please delete as necessary:
1 .1 have read the information sheet about these studies YES/NO
2 .1 have a contact address if I wish to ask questions and discuss these studies
YES/NO
3. I have received sufficient information about these studies YES/NO
4 .1 understand that I am free to withdraw from these studies
■ At any time
■ Without giving a reason for withdrawing YES/NO
■ Without affecting my future medical care
5. I am happy for my clinician to see my questionnaires YES/NO
6 .1 do/ do not* agree to take part in these studies (* please delete as appropriate)
Signed..............................................................................Date..........................
Name in Block Letters
If you would like to hear a summary of the results of these studies, please write 
your contact details below. These details will be kept separately from your 
questionnaires to make sure that your views are kept confidential.
There may also be the possibility of being involved in further research about this 
topic. If  you are happy to be contacted about this, please indicate below.
6. I would like to receive a summary of the results of these studies YES/NO
7 .1 am happy to be contacted about further research into this area by this clinic
YES/NO
Name:..........................................................................................................................
Address:......................................................................................................................
Postcode:
Tel:.........
Email:.....
Appendix 3
Experience of Shame Scale (ESS) 
(Andrews, Qian & Valentine, 2002)
123
ESS
Everybody at times can feel embarrassed, self-conscious or ashamed. These questions are
about such feelings if they have occurred at any tim e in the past year. There are no 'right' or
'wrong' answers. Please indicate the response which applies to you with a tick.
not at all a  little moderately very much
1. Have you felt asham ed of any of your personal ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
habits?
2. Have you worried about what other ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
people think of any of your personal habits?
3. Have you tried to cover up or conceal any ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of your personal habits?
4. H ave you felt asham ed of your manner with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
o thers?
5. Have you worried about what other people ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
think of your m anner with others?
6 . Have you avoided people because of your ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m anner?
7. Have you felt asham ed of the sort of person ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
you are?
8 . Have you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of the sort of person you are?
9. Have you tried to conceal from others the sort ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of person you are?
10. Have you felt asham ed of your ability to do ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
things?
11. Have you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of your ability to do things?
12 . Have you avoided people because of your ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
inability to do things?
13. Do you feel asham ed when you do something ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
wrong?
14. Have you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of you when you do something wrong?
15. Have you tried to cover up or conceal things ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
you felt asham ed  of having done?
16. Have you felt asham ed  when you said ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
som ething stupid?
17. Have you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of you when you said som ething stupid?
18. Have you avoided contact with anyone who ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
knew you said something stupid?
19. H ave you felt asham ed when you failed at ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
som ething that was important to you?
20. H ave you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of you when you fail?
21 . Have you avoided people who have seen  you ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
fail?
22. Have you felt asham ed of your body or any part ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of it?
23. Have you worried about what other people think ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
of your appearance?
24. H ave you avoided looking at yourself in the ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
mirror?
25. Have you wanted to hide of conceal your body ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
or any part of it?
Appendix 4
The Forms of Self-Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale (FSCRS)
(Gilbert, Clarke, Hempel, Miles & Irons, 2004)
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FSCRS
When things go wrong in our lives or don’t work out as we hoped, and we feel we could 
have done better, we sometimes have negative and self-critical thoughts and feelings. These 
may take the form of feeling worthless, useless or inferior etc. However, people can also try 
to be supportive of themselves. Below are a series of thoughts and feelings that people 
sometimes have. Read each statement carefully and circle the number that best describes 
how much each statement is true for you.
When things go wrong for me:
Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
like me like me like me like me like me
1 . 1 am easily disappointed with mysel f 0 1 2  3 4
2. There is a part of  me that puts me down 0 1 2  3 4
3 . 1 am able to remind myself of  positive 0 1 2  3 4
things about myself
4 . 1 find it difficult to control my anger and 0 1 2  3 4
frustration at myself
5 . 1 find it easy to forgive mysel f 0 1 2  3 4
6. There is a part of  me that feels I am not 0 1 2 3 4
good enough
7 . 1 feel beaten down by my own self critical 0 1 2  3 4
thoughts
8 . 1 still like being me  0 1 2  3 4
9 . 1 have become so angry with mysel f that 1 0  1 2 3 4
want to hurt or injure myself
10. 1 have a sense of disgust with myself 0 1 2  3 4
11. 1 can still feel loveable and acceptable 0 1 2  3 4
12. 1 stop caring about myself 0 1 2  3 4
13. 1 find it easy to like myself 0 1 2  3 4
14. 1 remember and dwell on my failings 0 1 2  3 4
15 . 1 call myself names 0 1 2  3 4
16 . 1 am gentle and supportive with myself 0 1 2  3 4
17 . 1 can’t accept failures and setbacks 0 1 2  3 4
without feeling inadequate
18. 1 think I deserve my self-criticism 0 1 2  3 4
1 9 .1 am able to care and look after myself 0 1 2  3 4
20. There is a part of me that wants to get rid 0 1 2 3 4
of the bits I don’t like
2 1 . 1 encourage myself for the future 0 1 2  3 4
2 2 .1 do not like being me 0 1 2  3 4
Appendix 5
The Functions of Self-Criticising/Attacking Scale (FSCS)
(Gilbert, Clarke, Hempel, Miles & Irons, 2004)
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FSCS
There can be many reasons why people become critical and angry with themselves. Read 
each statement carefully and circle the number that best describes how much each statement 
is true for you.
I get critical and angry with myself:
1. to make sure I keep up my standards
2. to stop myself being happy
3. to show I care about my mistakes
4. because if I punish myself I feel better
5. to stop me being lazy
6. to harm part of myself
7. to keep myself in check
8. to punish myself for my mistakes
9. to cope with feelings of disgust with myself
10. to take revenge on part of myself
11. to stop me getting overconfident
12. to stop me being angry with others
13. to destroy a part of me
14. to make me concentrate
15. to gain reassurance from others
16. to stop me becoming arrogant
17. to prevent future embarrassments
18. to remind me of my past failures
19. to keep me from making minor mistakes
20. to remind me o f my responsibilities
21. to get at the things I hate in myself
Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
like me like me like me like me like me
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
